feat: account menu, database roles, and single logout
Bundles the console work from the current branch: the header account control, database-backed roles and permissions, and signing out across the applications that share this sign-in. The account control replaces a separate identity chip and a separate sign-out button, which meant the header carried two controls describing one fact. web/account.js is mounted into every page by a placeholder and owns the keyboard handling, the outside-click behaviour and the sign-out form once. It also fills the trigger's name, which the previous markup left empty. Signing out revokes the hosted-login bearer sessions this installation issued, then redirects to the provider's end_session_endpoint when the discovery document advertises one. Applications that authenticate against this installation therefore lose their session too; one pointed straight at an identity provider is out of its reach and is unchanged. Roles and permissions become rows rather than a closed enum, so a tenant can extend the catalog without a migration, and a role can no longer be granted a capability that is not in it. requireSameOrigin now compares against the origin the request arrived on instead of the configured base URL, which defaulted to http://localhost:8080 and so rejected every write in a deployment that never set it. Two bugs found while verifying in a browser: - A profile picture never rendered. avatarURL built an absolute URL from the configured base URL, and the page's own img-src 'self' blocked it. The console's own pages now take a root-relative path; only /connect/userinfo, read from another origin, needs an absolute one, and it follows the request. - absoluteURL preferred the configuration over the request while its comment claimed the opposite, which also misdirected the logout redirect. Card layout: the footer was one two-column row shared between a label and a forty-character identifier, so the identifier took the width and crushed its label into three stacked words. Each pair is a line now, the value truncates with the full text in the title, and cards align their footers across a row.
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@ -126,19 +126,38 @@ Both `/connect/token` and `/connect/userinfo` return the caller's `role`, `permi
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```json
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{
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"sub": "9f0f...",
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"id": "9f0f...",
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"email": "ada@example.com",
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"display_name": "Ada Lovelace",
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"avatar_url": "https://loose.example.com/api/v1/avatars/kZ3...",
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"tenant_id": "2b41...",
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"tenant_slug": "nmbs",
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"application_id": "7c02...",
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"application": "guess",
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"role": "developer",
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"permissions": ["console.read", "profile.edit", "applications.manage", "keys.manage", "contracts.manage"],
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"can": {"contracts.manage": true, "users.manage": false}
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"permissions": [
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"console.read",
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"users.read",
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"applications.manage",
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"keys.manage",
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"contracts.manage",
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"users.manage",
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"profile.edit"
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]
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}
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```
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`avatar_url` is public by design, so it can be embedded directly with a plain image tag. It is an empty string when the user has not uploaded a picture. Read `can` rather than checking `role` by name; the client package builds it from the same matrix the console uses. See [roles and capabilities](roles.md).
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There is no `can` object on the wire. `avatar_url` is public by design, so it can be embedded directly with a plain image tag; it is an empty string when the user has not uploaded a picture.
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A user with no membership in the application's tenant still authenticates, but the role falls back to `user` with only `profile.edit`.
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Read `permissions` rather than testing `role` by name, because a tenant may define its own roles. The client package exposes the same check as a method:
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```go
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if user.Can("contracts.manage") {
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// the role behind this session grants it
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}
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```
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A user with no membership in the application's tenant still authenticates, but falls back to the built-in `user` role, whose only permission is `profile.edit`. See [roles, permissions, and profiles](roles.md).
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## Security and availability
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@ -147,8 +166,43 @@ A user with no membership in the application's tenant still authenticates, but t
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- Do not replace the middleware's fail-closed behavior with an allow-on-error fallback.
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- Apply CSRF protection to state-changing routes in the client application; the package handles login `state`, not your application forms.
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- The middleware checks Go Loose on every request for immediate revocation. Deploy Go Loose highly available and use a bounded HTTP timeout.
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- Signing out in Go Loose revokes every hosted-login session the user holds here, so
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the client applications stop accepting their tokens on the next request. See
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[Signing out across the family](#signing-out-across-the-family).
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- API-key authentication and browser-user authentication are independent. Use `client.Middleware` for service/API keys and `BrowserAuth.Middleware` for logged-in users.
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## Signing out across the family
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Applications in this family share one identity, so signing out has to mean more than
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clearing one cookie. `POST /auth/logout` does three things, in this order:
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1. **Revokes every hosted-login session the user holds.** Go Loose issues the bearer
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tokens these applications authenticate with, so this is what actually signs them
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out: their tokens stop resolving immediately, without the application being told
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or having to ask. This step reads the session first, which is why it happens before
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the cookie is cleared.
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2. **Clears the local management cookies** on the identity domain.
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3. **Sends the browser to the identity provider's logout endpoint**, when the provider
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advertises one in its discovery document, so the single sign-on session ends too.
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Two consequences worth designing around:
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- **A client application is signed out on its next request, not by being notified.**
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Its own session cookie still exists; the bearer token inside it has been revoked. An
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application that only checks the session locally will appear signed in until its
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next call to Go Loose, at which point it should treat the rejection as a sign-out and
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return the browser to `/login`.
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- **Applications that authenticate against a different provider are not covered.**
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The provider endpoint is read from the issuer Go Loose itself is configured with, so
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this covers the applications that sign in through Go Loose. One pointed at a separate
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identity provider needs its own end-session redirect.
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A provider that does not advertise `end_session_endpoint` is not an error: step 3 is
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skipped and the user lands back on the sign-in page, having still been signed out
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locally and revoked. Go Loose sends `client_id` and `post_logout_redirect_uri` rather
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than an `id_token_hint`, because a hint would mean keeping a live credential in the
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browser cookie between login and logout.
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## Applications on the local platform
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The local platform signs in two client applications, both with the wildcard
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