test: drive the whole application over HTTP, and serialise migrations
The behaviour suite in internal/behaviour installs the application into an empty database through the web installer, signs in, walks every flow, and then replaces the process to confirm the state was persisted rather than held in memory. It found four defects, each fixed here or in the preceding commit: - Migrate was not safe to run from two instances at once. CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS is not race free in PostgreSQL and collided on the pg_type unique index, and two replicas could apply the same file. The run now holds a session-level advisory lock, so a rolling deployment waits instead of failing. - Bootstrap refused ownership whenever a tenant held any member, so installing with the demonstration seed and then setting a local administrator password produced an account that could never reach the console. It now grants ownership only while the tenant has no owner, which still never takes a tenant over from one that does. Three of the fixes are covered by store-level regression tests in the same commit: the ownership rule, the duplicate tenant slug conflict, and concurrent migration runs. The suite is skipped by go test ./... because it needs a scratch database and the Google credentials for the installer. Run it with make behaviour-test, which also resets the database afterwards. make test no longer inherits the database variables, so unit runs need nothing. Completes the earlier correction to the docs: the role matrix lives in the database rather than in internal/role, and a local administrator claims the system administrator role when no Google account has.
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@ -170,6 +170,13 @@ A user with no membership in the application's tenant still authenticates, but f
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the client applications stop accepting their tokens on the next request. See
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[Signing out across the family](#signing-out-across-the-family).
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- API-key authentication and browser-user authentication are independent. Use `client.Middleware` for service/API keys and `BrowserAuth.Middleware` for logged-in users.
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- **A `user_application_access` grant is the only thing that admits a person to your
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application.** The system administrator is not an exception: they own every tenant,
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which is what lets them administer it, but ownership does not sign them in here.
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Nobody, administrator included, reaches your application without a grant recorded
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against your `client_id`. If support needs to see the application as a user, grant
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it deliberately from **Users & access** so it is attributable and revocable, rather
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than assuming the administrator is already inside.
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## Signing out across the family
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@ -33,7 +33,9 @@ Later requests to `/install` redirect to login, and duplicate submissions are re
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## First administrator and waiting room
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The first user who completes Google SSO becomes the system administrator. A PostgreSQL advisory transaction lock makes this first-user claim atomic when multiple users sign in concurrently. The system administrator receives owner access to every tenant and application that exists at that moment.
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The first user who completes Google SSO becomes the system administrator. A PostgreSQL advisory transaction lock makes this first-user claim atomic when multiple users sign in concurrently. The system administrator receives owner access to every tenant that exists at that moment.
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Owning a tenant is what lets the administrator administer it; it does not let them sign in to the applications running inside it. Access to a client application is always an explicit grant, so an administrator who wants to use one attaches themselves from **Users & access** like anybody else. The grant is visible, attributable and revocable, and revoking it signs them out of that application without affecting their console access.
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Later first-time SSO users are created without tenant membership. Their management page shows only the waiting room. A system administrator approves a waiting user from **Users & access**, selecting:
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@ -78,3 +80,14 @@ An application must first have exact redirect URIs and a generated client secret
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Existing deployments may continue to supply all three `GO_LOOSE_OIDC_ISSUER`, `GO_LOOSE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID`, and `GO_LOOSE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET` variables. Go Loose treats that as an already configured deployment and bypasses the installer. Supplying `GO_LOOSE_LOCAL_LOGIN=true` together with a non-empty `GO_LOOSE_LOCAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD` does the same for a database-only development deployment.
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For new installations, prefer the web installer. `GO_LOOSE_LOCAL_LOGIN=true` without a bootstrap password enables seeded and invited database users but does not bypass installation.
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Two rules make that second mode usable rather than merely possible:
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- The local administrator claims the system administrator role when the installation has none. Creating tenants and approving waiting-room users both require that role, and only a first Google sign-in otherwise grants it, so a database-only deployment would otherwise have nobody able to do either. The claim is a no-op once any system administrator exists, so an installation already owned by a Google account is untouched.
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- Bootstrapping grants ownership of a tenant only while that tenant has no owner. It deliberately does not care whether the tenant has other members, because the demonstration seed creates tenants holding administrators but no owner; refusing ownership there would leave a local administrator bootstrapped afterwards with an account that can never reach the console. A tenant that already has an owner is never taken over.
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Supplying `GO_LOOSE_LOCAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD` after a Google account has already claimed the role changes nothing.
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## Verifying an installation
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`make behaviour-test` installs the application into an empty database, signs in, walks every flow, and then restarts the process to confirm that everything was persisted rather than held in memory. See the [README](../README.md#behaviour-suite) for what it needs.
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@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ The provider must return `sub`, `email`, and preferably `name` claims.
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Migration files live in `internal/database/migrations` and are embedded into the binary. Files run lexicographically once, in individual transactions.
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A migration run holds a session-level advisory lock, so several replicas may start at the same time against one database. Without it the run races with itself: PostgreSQL's `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` is not race free and can fail with a duplicate `pg_type` row, and two replicas can try to apply the same file. The second replica waits and then finds the work already recorded.
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Create upgrades with an immutable numbered file:
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```text
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