fix installer

docs/roles.md

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+# Roles and capabilities
+
+Every tenant role maps to a fixed set of capabilities in `internal/role`. The console reads the capability list from the server instead of hardcoding role names, and store queries pass `role.Grants(...)` into SQL so authorization and rendering cannot drift apart.
+
+## Capability matrix
+
+| Capability | owner | admin | developer | operator | viewer | user |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `console.read` | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | no |
+| `applications.manage` | yes | yes | yes | no | no | no |
+| `keys.manage` | yes | yes | yes | yes | no | no |
+| `contracts.manage` | yes | yes | yes | yes | no | no |
+| `users.manage` | yes | yes | no | no | no | no |
+| `profile.edit` | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
+
+Intended use:
+
+- **owner** — full control of the tenant, including role assignment.
+- **admin** — manages applications, keys, contracts, and members.
+- **developer** — ships service contracts and API keys, but cannot change membership.
+- **operator** — runs existing applications: rotates keys and imports contracts.
+- **viewer** — read-only console access.
+- **user** — self-service only. No console access; the session lands on `/profile`.
+
+`user` members without any tenant membership still see the waiting room. Those with a membership are redirected from `/` to `/profile`, because the dashboard requires `console.read`.
+
+## Where the checks live
+
+Store methods enforce capabilities inside SQL (`role = ANY($n)` with a text array) or inside the same transaction as the write. The server additionally filters and labels UI controls with `role.Allows`. Both layers read the same matrix, so adding a capability or a role is a one-line change in `internal/role/role.go`.
+
+`role.Role` values are also validated by a database check constraint on `memberships.role`, so an unknown role cannot be stored even if a caller bypasses the Go layer.
+
+New roles must be added to the check constraint in a new migration as well as to the matrix; existing deployments keep the constraint in `internal/database/migrations/0005_roles_and_profile.sql` for historical reasons.
+
+## Display names and profile pictures
+
+Every management session can open `/profile` and set a display name and a profile picture, independent of tenant role.
+
+Setting the display name flags the user as `name_customized`, which stops the identity provider from overwriting it on the next login. The row is still matched by email on every login, so customization never breaks sign-in.
+
+Pictures are stored as bytes in PostgreSQL with a random 256-bit key and served from the public `GET /api/v1/avatars/{key}` route. The URL is unguessable and carries no user identity, so applications can embed it directly:
+
+```html
+<img src="https://loose.example.com/api/v1/avatars/kZ3..." alt="Ada Lovelace" width="64" height="64">
+```
+
+Accepted formats are JPEG, PNG, and GIF up to 2 MiB and 4096 by 4096 pixels. Replacing a picture issues a new key and retires the old one, so cached images never go stale and revoked URLs stop resolving.
+
+## Clients and permissions
+
+`/connect/token` and `/connect/userinfo` return the caller's `role`, `permissions`, and absolute `avatar_url`, resolved against the tenant that owns the application. `client.User.Can` exposes the same checks to Go code, so a client can adapt its UI without duplicating the matrix.
+
+A user with no membership in the application's tenant still authenticates, but the role falls back to `user` with only `profile.edit`.