diff --git a/.dockerignore b/.dockerignore
index 93e14b7..cc30164 100644
--- a/.dockerignore
+++ b/.dockerignore
@@ -3,4 +3,5 @@
 bin
 coverage.out
 google_secrets.json
+data
 
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index a0ace0d..7b36763 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 SHELL := /bin/sh
 
 GO_LOOSE_ADDR ?= :8081
+GO_LOOSE_PORT ?= 8081
 GO_LOOSE_BASE_URL ?= http://localhost:$(GO_LOOSE_PORT)
 GO_LOOSE_DATABASE_URL ?= postgres://goloose:goloose@localhost:5433/goloose?sslmode=disable
 GO_LOOSE_SESSION_SECRET ?= local-development-secret-change-me-now
@@ -29,8 +30,12 @@ integration-test:
 run:
 	go run ./cmd/go-loose
 
+# The variables above are exported for `make run`, but compose reads
+# GO_LOOSE_BASE_URL too and would inherit the local http://localhost:8081 value,
+# which then overrides the https:// defaults in docker-compose.yaml. Clearing it
+# for the compose targets lets compose apply its own defaults.
 compose-up:
-	docker compose up --build
+	GO_LOOSE_BASE_URL= docker compose up --build
 
 compose-down:
 	docker compose down
diff --git a/docs/roles.md b/docs/roles.md
index 366f9b1..3016b7a 100644
--- a/docs/roles.md
+++ b/docs/roles.md
@@ -1,36 +1,71 @@
 # Roles and capabilities
 
-Every tenant role maps to a fixed set of capabilities in `internal/role`. The console reads the capability list from the server instead of hardcoding role names, and store queries pass `role.Grants(...)` into SQL so authorization and rendering cannot drift apart.
+A role is a named bundle of permissions. Roles are rows: six built-in ones seeded by migration `0006_database_roles.sql`, plus whatever each tenant defines for itself. `internal/role` no longer holds a matrix — it holds the closed vocabulary of permissions a role may be granted, and the database resolves what a membership actually grants.
 
-## Capability matrix
+```
+roles              one row per role. tenant_id NULL means built-in.
+role_permissions   (role_id, permission) — what the role grants.
+memberships.role_id → roles.id, NOT NULL, ON DELETE RESTRICT
+```
 
-| Capability | owner | admin | developer | operator | viewer | user |
+## Built-in capability matrix
+
+This is what the migration seeds. It is data, not code: change it with a new migration, not by editing Go.
+
+| Permission | owner | admin | developer | operator | viewer | user |
 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| `console.read` | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | no |
+| `tenants.manage` | yes | no | no | no | no | no |
+| `roles.manage` | yes | yes | no | no | no | no |
+| `users.manage` | yes | yes | yes | yes | no | no |
 | `applications.manage` | yes | yes | yes | no | no | no |
 | `keys.manage` | yes | yes | yes | yes | no | no |
 | `contracts.manage` | yes | yes | yes | yes | no | no |
-| `users.manage` | yes | yes | no | no | no | no |
+| `users.read` | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | no |
+| `console.read` | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | no |
 | `profile.edit` | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
 
 Intended use:
 
-- **owner** — full control of the tenant, including role assignment.
-- **admin** — manages applications, keys, contracts, and members.
-- **developer** — ships service contracts and API keys, but cannot change membership.
-- **operator** — runs existing applications: rotates keys and imports contracts.
+- **owner** — full control of the tenant, including defining roles and handing them out.
+- **admin** — manages applications, keys, contracts, members, and roles.
+- **developer** — ships applications, keys, and contracts, and maintains the tenant's members.
+- **operator** — runs existing applications and maintains the tenant's members.
 - **viewer** — read-only console access.
 - **user** — self-service only. No console access; the session lands on `/profile`.
 
+`developer` and `operator` hold `users.manage` so that anyone who runs the console can maintain their own tenant's members. `roles.manage` deliberately stays narrow: defining roles is what defines privilege, so it is not something a member administrator can grant themselves.
+
 `user` members without any tenant membership still see the waiting room. Those with a membership are redirected from `/` to `/profile`, because the dashboard requires `console.read`.
 
+## Tenant-defined roles
+
+`POST /api/v1/roles` creates a role for one tenant. It is visible only in that tenant, and the `/roles` screen lists it beside the built-ins with its permission chips.
+
+Three rules keep this from becoming a privilege-escalation hole:
+
+1. **Roles are scoped.** `roles.tenant_id` is set, and every query that resolves a role filters on the caller's own tenant, so a role id cannot be probed across tenants.
+2. **You cannot mint what you do not hold.** Creating or editing a role requires `roles.manage` *and* requires every permission in the role to be one the caller already has. Assigning a role enforces the same subset rule.
+3. **A role in use cannot be deleted.** `memberships.role_id` is `ON DELETE RESTRICT`, and `DELETE /api/v1/roles/{id}` reports 409 until the members are moved. Built-in roles are immutable and report 404.
+
+Built-in roles are read only: the store refuses to edit or delete a row with `is_system` set.
+
 ## Where the checks live
 
-Store methods enforce capabilities inside SQL (`role = ANY($n)` with a text array) or inside the same transaction as the write. The server additionally filters and labels UI controls with `role.Allows`. Both layers read the same matrix, so adding a capability or a role is a one-line change in `internal/role/role.go`.
+Tenant-scoped statements resolve the grant through `role_permissions` using one shared predicate, `permissionPredicate` in `internal/store/roles.go`:
 
-`role.Role` values are also validated by a database check constraint on `memberships.role`, so an unknown role cannot be stored even if a caller bypasses the Go layer.
+```sql
+EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1
+    FROM memberships scoped
+    JOIN role_permissions granted ON granted.role_id = scoped.role_id
+    WHERE scoped.tenant_id = $1 AND scoped.user_id = $2
+      AND granted.permission = $3
+)
+```
 
-New roles must be added to the check constraint in a new migration as well as to the matrix; existing deployments keep the constraint in `internal/database/migrations/0005_roles_and_profile.sql` for historical reasons.
+Because the check asks for a permission rather than a role name, a tenant's own role works everywhere a built-in one does without any Go change. The server never decides authorization: `handleStoreError` maps `store.ErrNotFound` to a 404 so a denied write and a missing row are indistinguishable.
+
+`role.Permission` names are also constrained by a check constraint on `role_permissions.permission`, so an unknown capability cannot be stored even if a caller bypasses the Go layer. **Adding a permission therefore needs three edits**: the constant in `internal/role/role.go`, the check constraint and seed in a new migration, and the expected grants in `internal/store/roles_integration_test.go`.
 
 ## Display names and profile pictures
 
@@ -50,4 +85,4 @@ Accepted formats are JPEG, PNG, and GIF up to 2 MiB and 4096 by 4096 pixels. Rep
 
 `/connect/token` and `/connect/userinfo` return the caller's `role`, `permissions`, and absolute `avatar_url`, resolved against the tenant that owns the application. `client.User.Can` exposes the same checks to Go code, so a client can adapt its UI without duplicating the matrix.
 
-A user with no membership in the application's tenant still authenticates, but the role falls back to `user` with only `profile.edit`.
\ No newline at end of file
+A user with no membership in the application's tenant still authenticates, but the role falls back to the built-in `user` role with only `profile.edit`.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/internal/database/migrations/0006_database_roles.sql b/internal/database/migrations/0006_database_roles.sql
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8bd84d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/database/migrations/0006_database_roles.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+-- +goose Up
+-- Roles become rows so a tenant can define its own. A NULL tenant_id marks a
+-- built-in role: every tenant sees it and nobody may edit or delete it.
+CREATE TABLE roles (
+    id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
+    tenant_id uuid REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    slug text NOT NULL CHECK (slug ~ '^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$'),
+    name text NOT NULL CHECK (length(btrim(name)) BETWEEN 1 AND 100),
+    description text NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    is_system boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+    created_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    updated_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    -- Custom roles belong to exactly one tenant; built-in roles to none.
+    CONSTRAINT roles_scope CHECK (
+        (is_system AND tenant_id IS NULL) OR (NOT is_system AND tenant_id IS NOT NULL)
+    )
+);
+
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX roles_system_slug_unique ON roles (slug) WHERE tenant_id IS NULL;
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX roles_tenant_slug_unique ON roles (tenant_id, slug) WHERE tenant_id IS NOT NULL;
+
+-- The permission vocabulary is closed, so keep this list in step with the
+-- constants in internal/role.
+CREATE TABLE role_permissions (
+    role_id uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES roles(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    permission text NOT NULL CHECK (permission IN (
+        'console.read', 'users.read', 'applications.manage', 'keys.manage',
+        'contracts.manage', 'users.manage', 'roles.manage', 'tenants.manage',
+        'profile.edit')),
+    created_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    PRIMARY KEY (role_id, permission)
+);
+
+INSERT INTO roles (slug, name, description, is_system) VALUES
+    ('owner', 'Owner', 'Full control of the tenant, including roles, members, and tenant settings.', true),
+    ('admin', 'Administrator', 'Manages applications, credentials, contracts, members, and roles.', true),
+    ('developer', 'Developer', 'Manages applications, credentials, contracts, and members.', true),
+    ('operator', 'Operator', 'Issues and revokes credentials, imports contracts, and manages members.', true),
+    ('viewer', 'Viewer', 'Reads the console without changing anything.', true),
+    ('user', 'User', 'Self-service member with no console access.', true);
+
+-- Seed what used to be the Go matrix. developer and operator join owner and
+-- admin in holding users.manage so that any tenant member who runs the console
+-- can maintain their own tenant's members. roles.manage stays with owner and
+-- admin: minting roles is what defines privilege in the first place.
+INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission)
+SELECT r.id, granted.permission
+FROM (VALUES
+    ('owner', ARRAY[
+        'console.read', 'users.read', 'applications.manage', 'keys.manage',
+        'contracts.manage', 'users.manage', 'roles.manage', 'tenants.manage',
+        'profile.edit']),
+    ('admin', ARRAY[
+        'console.read', 'users.read', 'applications.manage', 'keys.manage',
+        'contracts.manage', 'users.manage', 'roles.manage', 'profile.edit']),
+    ('developer', ARRAY[
+        'console.read', 'users.read', 'applications.manage', 'keys.manage',
+        'contracts.manage', 'users.manage', 'profile.edit']),
+    ('operator', ARRAY[
+        'console.read', 'users.read', 'keys.manage', 'contracts.manage',
+        'users.manage', 'profile.edit']),
+    ('viewer', ARRAY['console.read', 'users.read', 'profile.edit']),
+    ('user', ARRAY['profile.edit'])
+) AS seed(slug, permissions)
+JOIN roles r ON r.slug = seed.slug AND r.tenant_id IS NULL
+CROSS JOIN LATERAL unnest(seed.permissions) AS granted(permission);
+
+-- Point every membership at a role row. RESTRICT rather than CASCADE so that a
+-- role still held by somebody cannot be deleted out from under them.
+ALTER TABLE memberships ADD COLUMN role_id uuid REFERENCES roles(id) ON DELETE RESTRICT;
+
+UPDATE memberships m SET role_id = r.id
+FROM roles r
+WHERE r.tenant_id IS NULL AND r.slug = m.role;
+
+DO $$
+BEGIN
+    IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM memberships WHERE role_id IS NULL) THEN
+        RAISE EXCEPTION 'cannot migrate memberships: a membership names a role that was never seeded';
+    END IF;
+END
+$$;
+
+ALTER TABLE memberships ALTER COLUMN role_id SET NOT NULL;
+ALTER TABLE memberships DROP CONSTRAINT memberships_role_check;
+ALTER TABLE memberships DROP COLUMN role;
+
+-- +goose Down
+ALTER TABLE memberships ADD COLUMN role text;
+
+UPDATE memberships m SET role = r.slug
+FROM roles r
+WHERE r.id = m.role_id AND r.is_system;
+
+-- Custom roles have no equivalent in the old fixed vocabulary.
+UPDATE memberships SET role = 'viewer' WHERE role IS NULL;
+
+ALTER TABLE memberships DROP CONSTRAINT memberships_role_check;
+ALTER TABLE memberships
+    ADD CONSTRAINT memberships_role_check
+    CHECK (role IN ('owner', 'admin', 'developer', 'operator', 'viewer', 'user'));
+ALTER TABLE memberships ALTER COLUMN role SET NOT NULL;
+ALTER TABLE memberships DROP COLUMN role_id;
+
+DROP TABLE role_permissions;
+DROP TABLE roles;
diff --git a/internal/role/role.go b/internal/role/role.go
index c4f3bda..bbaa361 100644
--- a/internal/role/role.go
+++ b/internal/role/role.go
@@ -1,175 +1,132 @@
-// Package role defines the tenant membership roles and the single permission
-// matrix that authorizes console and management behavior.
+// Package role defines the permission vocabulary that authorizes console and
+// management behavior.
 //
-// Roles are stored in memberships.role. Authorization decisions must derive
-// from Grants or Allows so that SQL role checks and Go checks cannot drift
-// apart.
+// Roles are rows in the roles table and their permissions live in
+// role_permissions, so a tenant can define its own and authorization is
+// resolved by the database rather than from a matrix held here. What belongs in
+// this package is the closed set of permissions a role may be granted, plus the
+// labels the console renders.
+//
+// Keep the permission list in step with the role_permissions_permission_check
+// constraint in migration 0006: a name that is not in both places cannot be
+// stored.
 package role
 
-// Role is a tenant membership role.
-type Role string
-
-const (
-	// Owner has full control of a tenant, including tenant-level settings.
-	Owner Role = "owner"
-	// Admin manages applications, credentials, contracts, and members.
-	Admin Role = "admin"
-	// Developer manages applications, credentials, and contracts.
-	Developer Role = "developer"
-	// Operator issues and revokes credentials and imports contracts.
-	Operator Role = "operator"
-	// Viewer reads the console without changing anything.
-	Viewer Role = "viewer"
-	// User is a self-service member. It carries no console access and exists so
-	// that end users of client applications still hold a tenant role that
-	// applications can read through /connect/userinfo.
-	User Role = "user"
-)
-
 // Permission is a capability granted by a role.
 type Permission string
 
 const (
-	ReadConsole        Permission = "console.read"
-	ReadUsers          Permission = "users.read"
+	// ReadConsole opens the management console. Self-service members lack it so
+	// that they are routed to their profile instead.
+	ReadConsole Permission = "console.read"
+	// ReadUsers lists a tenant's members and their roles.
+	ReadUsers Permission = "users.read"
+	// ManageApplications registers applications and configures their client
+	// credentials.
 	ManageApplications Permission = "applications.manage"
-	ManageKeys         Permission = "keys.manage"
-	ManageContracts    Permission = "contracts.manage"
-	ManageUsers        Permission = "users.manage"
-	ManageTenants      Permission = "tenants.manage"
-	EditProfile        Permission = "profile.edit"
+	// ManageKeys issues and revokes API keys.
+	ManageKeys Permission = "keys.manage"
+	// ManageContracts imports OpenAPI contracts.
+	ManageContracts Permission = "contracts.manage"
+	// ManageUsers invites members and changes the roles and application grants
+	// of existing ones.
+	ManageUsers Permission = "users.manage"
+	// ManageRoles creates and edits the tenant's own roles. Kept separate from
+	// ManageUsers because defining roles is what defines privilege.
+	ManageRoles Permission = "roles.manage"
+	// ManageTenants creates tenants and administers the installation.
+	ManageTenants Permission = "tenants.manage"
+	// EditProfile changes one's own display name and picture.
+	EditProfile Permission = "profile.edit"
 )
 
-// catalog lists every role in descending order of privilege.
-var catalog = []Role{Owner, Admin, Developer, Operator, Viewer, User}
-
-// grants is the permission matrix. ReadConsole is deliberately absent for User
-// so that self-service members are routed to the profile screen instead of the
-// management console.
-var grants = map[Role]map[Permission]bool{
-	Owner: {
-		ReadConsole: true, ReadUsers: true, ManageApplications: true, ManageKeys: true,
-		ManageContracts: true, ManageUsers: true, ManageTenants: true, EditProfile: true,
-	},
-	Admin: {
-		ReadConsole: true, ReadUsers: true, ManageApplications: true, ManageKeys: true,
-		ManageContracts: true, ManageUsers: true, EditProfile: true,
-	},
-	Developer: {
-		ReadConsole: true, ReadUsers: true, ManageApplications: true, ManageKeys: true,
-		ManageContracts: true, EditProfile: true,
-	},
-	Operator: {
-		ReadConsole: true, ReadUsers: true, ManageKeys: true, ManageContracts: true, EditProfile: true,
-	},
-	Viewer: {
-		ReadConsole: true, ReadUsers: true, EditProfile: true,
-	},
-	User: {
-		EditProfile: true,
-	},
-}
-
+// ordered lists every permission from most to least sensitive. The order is the
+// one the console renders checkboxes in.
 var ordered = []Permission{
-	ReadConsole, ReadUsers, ManageApplications, ManageKeys,
-	ManageContracts, ManageUsers, ManageTenants, EditProfile,
+	ManageTenants,
+	ManageRoles,
+	ManageUsers,
+	ManageApplications,
+	ManageKeys,
+	ManageContracts,
+	ReadUsers,
+	ReadConsole,
+	EditProfile,
 }
 
-// Entry describes a role for the console and for API clients.
+var known = map[Permission]bool{
+	ReadConsole:        true,
+	ReadUsers:          true,
+	ManageApplications: true,
+	ManageKeys:         true,
+	ManageContracts:    true,
+	ManageUsers:        true,
+	ManageRoles:        true,
+	ManageTenants:      true,
+	EditProfile:        true,
+}
+
+// Entry describes a permission for the console and for API clients.
 type Entry struct {
-	Value       string   `json:"value"`
-	Label       string   `json:"label"`
-	Permissions []string `json:"permissions"`
+	Value       string `json:"value"`
+	Label       string `json:"label"`
+	Description string `json:"description"`
 }
 
-var labels = map[Role]string{
-	Owner:     "Owner",
-	Admin:     "Administrator",
-	Developer: "Developer",
-	Operator:  "Operator",
-	Viewer:    "Viewer",
-	User:      "User",
+var details = map[Permission]struct{ label, description string }{
+	ReadConsole:        {"Read console", "Open the management console and pick tenants."},
+	ReadUsers:          {"Read members", "List the members of a tenant and the roles they hold."},
+	ManageApplications: {"Manage applications", "Register applications and configure client credentials."},
+	ManageKeys:         {"Manage API keys", "Issue and revoke API keys."},
+	ManageContracts:    {"Manage contracts", "Import OpenAPI contracts and their endpoints."},
+	ManageUsers:        {"Manage members", "Invite members and change their roles and application grants."},
+	ManageRoles:        {"Manage roles", "Create and edit the roles of this tenant."},
+	ManageTenants:      {"Manage tenants", "Create tenants and administer the installation."},
+	EditProfile:        {"Edit own profile", "Change one's own display name and picture."},
 }
 
-// All returns every role ordered from most to least privileged.
-func All() []Role {
-	result := make([]Role, len(catalog))
-	copy(result, catalog)
+// Permissions returns every permission in display order.
+func Permissions() []Permission {
+	result := make([]Permission, len(ordered))
+	copy(result, ordered)
 	return result
 }
 
-// Catalog returns every role with its label and permissions so that the console
-// and API clients never hardcode the role list.
-func Catalog() []Entry {
-	result := make([]Entry, 0, len(catalog))
-	for _, item := range catalog {
-		result = append(result, Entry{Value: string(item), Label: labels[item], Permissions: item.Permissions()})
-	}
-	return result
-}
-
-// Parse converts a stored or submitted value into a Role.
-func Parse(value string) (Role, bool) {
-	candidate := Role(value)
-	if _, known := grants[candidate]; !known {
+// Parse validates a submitted permission name. Unknown values are rejected so
+// that a crafted payload cannot invent capabilities.
+func Parse(value string) (Permission, bool) {
+	candidate := Permission(value)
+	if !known[candidate] {
 		return "", false
 	}
 	return candidate, true
 }
 
-// Valid reports whether the value names a role.
-func (r Role) Valid() bool {
-	_, known := grants[r]
-	return known
+// Valid reports whether the value names a permission.
+func (p Permission) Valid() bool {
+	return known[p]
 }
 
-// Allows reports whether the role grants the permission.
-func (r Role) Allows(permission Permission) bool {
-	return grants[r][permission]
+// Catalog returns every permission with a label and description so that the
+// console and API clients never hardcode the list.
+func Catalog() []Entry {
+	result := make([]Entry, 0, len(ordered))
+	for _, permission := range ordered {
+		detail := details[permission]
+		result = append(result, Entry{
+			Value:       string(permission),
+			Label:       detail.label,
+			Description: detail.description,
+		})
+	}
+	return result
 }
 
-// Permissions returns the role's permissions in a stable order.
-func (r Role) Permissions() []string {
+// Values returns every permission as strings, for use as a SQL array parameter.
+func Values() []string {
 	result := make([]string, 0, len(ordered))
 	for _, permission := range ordered {
-		if r.Allows(permission) {
-			result = append(result, string(permission))
-		}
-	}
-	return result
-}
-
-// Grants returns the roles that grant a permission, for use as a SQL parameter
-// so that role checks in queries stay aligned with this matrix.
-func Grants(permission Permission) []string {
-	result := make([]string, 0, len(catalog))
-	for _, item := range catalog {
-		if item.Allows(permission) {
-			result = append(result, string(item))
-		}
-	}
-	return result
-}
-
-// Grantable returns the roles a tenant administrator may hand to a new member.
-// Ownership is not grantable during an invitation because it is established by
-// creating or claiming a tenant.
-func Grantable() []Role {
-	result := make([]Role, 0, len(catalog)-1)
-	for _, item := range catalog {
-		if item != Owner {
-			result = append(result, item)
-		}
-	}
-	return result
-}
-
-// GrantableValues returns Grantable as strings for a request payload.
-func GrantableValues() []string {
-	values := Grantable()
-	result := make([]string, len(values))
-	for index, item := range values {
-		result[index] = string(item)
+		result = append(result, string(permission))
 	}
 	return result
 }
diff --git a/internal/role/role_test.go b/internal/role/role_test.go
index d22a107..749b3a5 100644
--- a/internal/role/role_test.go
+++ b/internal/role/role_test.go
@@ -6,130 +6,112 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 )
 
-func TestParseRejectsUnknownRoles(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		value string
-		want  bool
-	}{
-		{value: "owner", want: true},
-		{value: "admin", want: true},
-		{value: "developer", want: true},
-		{value: "operator", want: true},
-		{value: "viewer", want: true},
-		{value: "user", want: true},
-		{value: "Owner", want: false},
-		{value: "", want: false},
-		{value: "superuser", want: false},
-		{value: "owner; DROP TABLE memberships", want: false},
+func TestParseRejectsUnknownPermissions(t *testing.T) {
+	valid := []string{
+		"console.read", "users.read", "applications.manage", "keys.manage",
+		"contracts.manage", "users.manage", "roles.manage", "tenants.manage",
+		"profile.edit",
 	}
-	for _, test := range tests {
-		t.Run(test.value, func(t *testing.T) {
-			_, ok := Parse(test.value)
-			if ok != test.want {
-				t.Fatalf("Parse(%q) ok = %v, want %v", test.value, ok, test.want)
-			}
-		})
+	for _, value := range valid {
+		if _, ok := Parse(value); !ok {
+			t.Errorf("Parse(%q) = not ok, want a permission", value)
+		}
 	}
-}
-
-func TestPermissionMatrix(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		role       Role
-		permission Permission
-		want       bool
-	}{
-		{role: Owner, permission: ManageTenants, want: true},
-		{role: Owner, permission: ManageUsers, want: true},
-		{role: Admin, permission: ManageTenants, want: false},
-		{role: Admin, permission: ManageUsers, want: true},
-		{role: Admin, permission: ManageApplications, want: true},
-		{role: Developer, permission: ManageUsers, want: false},
-		{role: Developer, permission: ManageApplications, want: true},
-		{role: Developer, permission: ManageKeys, want: true},
-		{role: Developer, permission: ManageContracts, want: true},
-		{role: Operator, permission: ManageApplications, want: false},
-		{role: Operator, permission: ManageKeys, want: true},
-		{role: Operator, permission: ManageContracts, want: true},
-		{role: Viewer, permission: ManageKeys, want: false},
-		{role: Viewer, permission: ReadConsole, want: true},
-		{role: User, permission: ReadConsole, want: false},
-		{role: User, permission: ReadUsers, want: false},
-		{role: User, permission: EditProfile, want: true},
-	}
-	for _, test := range tests {
-		t.Run(string(test.role)+"/"+string(test.permission), func(t *testing.T) {
-			if got := test.role.Allows(test.permission); got != test.want {
-				t.Fatalf("Allows(%q) = %v, want %v", test.permission, got, test.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestEveryRoleCanEditItsOwnProfile(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, item := range All() {
-		if !item.Allows(EditProfile) {
-			t.Fatalf("role %q cannot edit its own profile", item)
+	for _, value := range []string{"", "Console.read", "console", "superuser", "users.manage; DROP TABLE roles"} {
+		if parsed, ok := Parse(value); ok {
+			t.Errorf("Parse(%q) = %q, want rejection", value, parsed)
 		}
 	}
 }
 
-func TestGrantsMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, permission := range ordered {
-		granted := Grants(permission)
-		for _, item := range All() {
-			if slices.Contains(granted, string(item)) != item.Allows(permission) {
-				t.Fatalf("Grants(%q) and Allows disagree for role %q", permission, item)
+func TestValidMatchesParse(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, permission := range Permissions() {
+		if !permission.Valid() {
+			t.Errorf("%q reports itself invalid", permission)
+		}
+		if parsed, ok := Parse(string(permission)); !ok || parsed != permission {
+			t.Errorf("Parse(%q) did not round-trip", permission)
+		}
+	}
+	if Permission("nope").Valid() {
+		t.Error("an unknown permission reports itself valid")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPermissionsAreDottedNames(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, permission := range Permissions() {
+		name := string(permission)
+		if len(name) < 3 || strings.HasPrefix(name, ".") || strings.HasSuffix(name, ".") {
+			t.Fatalf("%q is not a plausible permission name", name)
+		}
+		dot := false
+		for _, character := range name {
+			switch {
+			case character == '.':
+				dot = true
+			case character >= 'a' && character <= 'z', character >= '0' && character <= '9', character == '-':
+			default:
+				t.Fatalf("%q contains %q; permissions use lowercase words", name, character)
 			}
 		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestGrantsListsRolesInPrivilegeOrder(t *testing.T) {
-	if got := Grants(ManageKeys); !slices.Equal(got, []string{"owner", "admin", "developer", "operator"}) {
-		t.Fatalf("Grants(ManageKeys) = %v", got)
-	}
-	if got := Grants(ManageUsers); !slices.Equal(got, []string{"owner", "admin"}) {
-		t.Fatalf("Grants(ManageUsers) = %v", got)
-	}
-	if got := Grants(ReadConsole); !slices.Contains(got, string(Owner)) || slices.Contains(got, string(User)) {
-		t.Fatalf("Grants(ReadConsole) = %v", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCatalogCoversEveryRoleWithALabel(t *testing.T) {
-	entries := Catalog()
-	if len(entries) != len(catalog) {
-		t.Fatalf("Catalog() length = %d, want %d", len(entries), len(catalog))
-	}
-	for _, entry := range entries {
-		if entry.Label == "" {
-			t.Fatalf("role %q has no label", entry.Value)
-		}
-		parsed, ok := Parse(entry.Value)
-		if !ok {
-			t.Fatalf("catalog entry %q is not a known role", entry.Value)
-		}
-		if len(entry.Permissions) != len(parsed.Permissions()) {
-			t.Fatalf("role %q catalog permissions drifted from the matrix", entry.Value)
+		if !dot {
+			t.Errorf("%q should be a namespaced name", name)
 		}
 	}
 }
 
-func TestGrantableExcludesOwner(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, item := range Grantable() {
-		if item == Owner {
-			t.Fatal("owner must not be grantable through an invitation")
-		}
+func TestCatalogDescribesEveryPermission(t *testing.T) {
+	catalog := Catalog()
+	if len(catalog) != len(Permissions()) {
+		t.Fatalf("catalog has %d entries, want %d", len(catalog), len(Permissions()))
 	}
-	if len(GrantableValues()) != len(catalog)-1 {
-		t.Fatalf("GrantableValues() length = %d", len(GrantableValues()))
+	seen := make(map[string]bool, len(catalog))
+	for _, entry := range catalog {
+		if entry.Value == "" || entry.Label == "" || entry.Description == "" {
+			t.Errorf("incomplete catalog entry %+v", entry)
+		}
+		if seen[entry.Value] {
+			t.Errorf("permission %q appears twice in the catalog", entry.Value)
+		}
+		seen[entry.Value] = true
 	}
 }
 
-func TestPermissionsUseDottedNames(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, permission := range All()[0].Permissions() {
-		if !strings.Contains(permission, ".") {
-			t.Fatalf("permission %q should be a dotted capability name", permission)
+// TestCatalogFollowsDisplayOrder guards the order the console renders the
+// permission checkboxes in: the most sensitive capability first.
+func TestCatalogFollowsDisplayOrder(t *testing.T) {
+	catalog := Catalog()
+	want := []string{"tenants.manage", "roles.manage", "users.manage"}
+	for index, value := range want {
+		if catalog[index].Value != value {
+			t.Errorf("catalog[%d] = %q, want %q", index, catalog[index].Value, value)
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+func TestPermissionsReturnsACopy(t *testing.T) {
+	first := Permissions()
+	if len(first) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("no permissions")
+	}
+	first[0] = "mutated"
+	if Permissions()[0] == "mutated" {
+		t.Error("Permissions exposed its backing array")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestValuesMatchesPermissions(t *testing.T) {
+	values := Values()
+	permissions := Permissions()
+	if len(values) != len(permissions) {
+		t.Fatalf("Values has %d entries, want %d", len(values), len(permissions))
+	}
+	for index, permission := range permissions {
+		if values[index] != string(permission) {
+			t.Errorf("Values()[%d] = %q, want %q", index, values[index], permission)
+		}
+	}
+	if !slices.Contains(values, string(ManageUsers)) {
+		t.Error("users.manage is missing from Values")
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/server/clientauth.go b/internal/server/clientauth.go
index f7e83cf..1b3ffaf 100644
--- a/internal/server/clientauth.go
+++ b/internal/server/clientauth.go
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/key"
-	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/role"
 	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/store"
 )
 
@@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ func (s *Server) clientUser(user store.ClientUser) clientUserResponse {
 		ID: user.ID, Email: user.Email, DisplayName: user.DisplayName,
 		AvatarURL: s.avatarURL(user.AvatarKey), TenantID: user.TenantID,
 		TenantSlug: user.TenantSlug, ApplicationID: user.ApplicationID, Application: user.Application,
-		Role: user.Role, Permissions: role.Role(user.Role).Permissions(),
+		Role: user.Role, Permissions: user.Permissions,
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/internal/server/origin_test.go b/internal/server/origin_test.go
index 25266a5..26f21bd 100644
--- a/internal/server/origin_test.go
+++ b/internal/server/origin_test.go
@@ -39,3 +39,100 @@ func TestRequireSameOriginRejectsDifferentTenantHost(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", response.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
 	}
 }
+
+// TestRequireSameOriginSurvivesStaleBaseURL covers the deployment that made
+// profile saves fail with "same-origin request required": the container was
+// started with a base URL of "http://localhost:" while users browsed to
+// https://auth.urpi.be. The configured base URL must not be the only accepted
+// origin, or a stale value breaks every state-changing route at once.
+func TestRequireSameOriginSurvivesStaleBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, baseURL := range []string{"http://localhost:", "", "http://localhost:8080", "not a url"} {
+		server := &Server{cfg: config.Config{BaseURL: baseURL}}
+		handler := server.requireSameOrigin(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+		}))
+		request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "https://auth.urpi.be/api/v1/profile", nil)
+		request.Header.Set("Origin", "https://auth.urpi.be")
+		response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+		handler.ServeHTTP(response, request)
+
+		if response.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
+			t.Errorf("base URL %q: status = %d, want %d", baseURL, response.Code, http.StatusNoContent)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRequireSameOriginAcceptsForwardedHTTPS covers a reverse proxy that
+// terminates TLS: the server sees a plain HTTP connection, so the scheme has to
+// come from X-Forwarded-Proto rather than from r.TLS.
+func TestRequireSameOriginAcceptsForwardedHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
+	server := &Server{cfg: config.Config{BaseURL: "http://go-loose:8080"}}
+	handler := server.requireSameOrigin(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+	}))
+	request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "http://auth.urpi.be/api/v1/profile", nil)
+	request.Host = "auth.urpi.be"
+	request.Header.Set("Origin", "https://auth.urpi.be")
+	request.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
+	response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	handler.ServeHTTP(response, request)
+
+	if response.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", response.Code, http.StatusNoContent)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequireSameOriginFallsBackToReferer(t *testing.T) {
+	server := &Server{cfg: config.Config{BaseURL: "https://auth.dev"}}
+	handler := server.requireSameOrigin(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+	}))
+	request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://auth.dev/api/v1/tenants", nil)
+	request.Header.Set("Referer", "https://auth.dev/console")
+	response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	handler.ServeHTTP(response, request)
+
+	if response.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", response.Code, http.StatusNoContent)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequireSameOriginRejectsMissingAndForeignSources(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		origin  string
+		referer string
+	}{
+		{name: "no origin or referer"},
+		{name: "foreign origin", origin: "https://evil.example"},
+		{name: "null origin", origin: "null"},
+		{name: "same host different scheme", origin: "http://auth.dev"},
+		{name: "origin is a prefix of the host", origin: "https://auth.dev.evil.example"},
+		{name: "referer from another tenant", referer: "https://ypto.auth.dev/profile"},
+	}
+	for _, testCase := range cases {
+		t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			server := &Server{cfg: config.Config{BaseURL: "https://auth.dev"}}
+			handler := server.requireSameOrigin(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+				t.Error("handler reached for a request that was not same-origin")
+			}))
+			request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://auth.dev/api/v1/tenants", nil)
+			if testCase.origin != "" {
+				request.Header.Set("Origin", testCase.origin)
+			}
+			if testCase.referer != "" {
+				request.Header.Set("Referer", testCase.referer)
+			}
+			response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+			handler.ServeHTTP(response, request)
+
+			if response.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+				t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", response.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/server/profile_test.go b/internal/server/profile_test.go
index 9668698..87e2869 100644
--- a/internal/server/profile_test.go
+++ b/internal/server/profile_test.go
@@ -52,12 +52,17 @@ func TestAvatarURLIsAbsoluteAndOmittedWithoutKey(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestClientUserExposesRoleCapabilitiesAndPicture checks that the identity
+// handed to a client application carries the capabilities the store resolved for
+// the membership's role rather than anything the server infers.
 func TestClientUserExposesRoleCapabilitiesAndPicture(t *testing.T) {
 	server := profileTestServer()
 	key := "avatar-key"
 	payload := server.clientUser(store.ClientUser{
 		ID: "user-1", Email: "operator@example.test", DisplayName: "Operator",
-		TenantSlug: "nmbs", Application: "guess", Role: string(role.Operator), AvatarKey: &key,
+		TenantSlug: "nmbs", Application: "guess", Role: "operator",
+		Permissions: []string{string(role.ManageKeys), string(role.EditProfile)},
+		AvatarKey:   &key,
 	})
 	if payload.Role != "operator" {
 		t.Fatalf("role = %q", payload.Role)
@@ -65,17 +70,21 @@ func TestClientUserExposesRoleCapabilitiesAndPicture(t *testing.T) {
 	if !slices.Contains(payload.Permissions, string(role.ManageKeys)) {
 		t.Fatalf("permissions = %v, want keys.manage", payload.Permissions)
 	}
-	if slices.Contains(payload.Permissions, string(role.ManageUsers)) {
-		t.Fatalf("permissions = %v, must not grant users.manage to an operator", payload.Permissions)
+	if slices.Contains(payload.Permissions, string(role.ManageTenants)) {
+		t.Fatalf("permissions = %v, must not grant tenants.manage", payload.Permissions)
 	}
 	if !strings.HasSuffix(payload.AvatarURL, "/api/v1/avatars/avatar-key") {
 		t.Fatalf("avatar url = %q", payload.AvatarURL)
 	}
 }
 
+// TestClientUserWithoutMembershipIsLeastPrivileged documents the pass-through: a
+// user with no membership is reported with the permissions of the built-in User
+// role, which the store resolves, so an empty capability set reaches clients
+// rather than an error.
 func TestClientUserWithoutMembershipIsLeastPrivileged(t *testing.T) {
 	server := profileTestServer()
-	payload := server.clientUser(store.ClientUser{Role: string(role.User)})
+	payload := server.clientUser(store.ClientUser{Role: "user", Permissions: []string{string(role.EditProfile)}})
 	if payload.AvatarURL != "" {
 		t.Fatalf("avatar url = %q, want empty", payload.AvatarURL)
 	}
@@ -138,38 +147,6 @@ func TestUpdateProfileRejectsOversizedBody(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestInvitableRoleExcludesOwner(t *testing.T) {
-	if _, ok := invitableRole(string(role.Owner)); ok {
-		t.Fatal("an invitation must not be able to grant ownership")
-	}
-	for _, item := range role.Grantable() {
-		if _, ok := invitableRole(string(item)); !ok {
-			t.Fatalf("invitableRole(%q) = false", item)
-		}
-	}
-	for _, item := range []string{"", "superuser", "Owner", "user'", "owner"} {
-		if item == string(role.Owner) {
-			continue
-		}
-		if _, ok := invitableRole(item); ok {
-			t.Fatalf("invitableRole(%q) = true", item)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestAssignableRoleAcceptsEveryKnownRole(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, item := range role.All() {
-		if got, ok := assignableRole(string(item)); !ok || got != string(item) {
-			t.Fatalf("assignableRole(%q) = %q, %v", item, got, ok)
-		}
-	}
-	for _, item := range []string{"", "superuser", "Owner", "admin,owner"} {
-		if _, ok := assignableRole(item); ok {
-			t.Fatalf("assignableRole(%q) = true", item)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 func TestProfilePageIsEmbedded(t *testing.T) {
 	content, err := web.Files.ReadFile("profile.html")
 	if err != nil {
diff --git a/internal/server/roles.go b/internal/server/roles.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bf5cbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/server/roles.go
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/store"
+)
+
+const (
+	maxRoleName        = 100
+	maxRoleDescription = 500
+)
+
+// rolesPage serves the role management screen.
+func (s *Server) rolesPage(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+	s.serveEmbedded(w, "roles.html")
+}
+
+// listRoles serves the role management screen's data: every built-in role plus
+// the tenant's own, each annotated with whether the caller may assign it.
+func (s *Server) listRoles(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	tenantID, ok := s.requestTenant(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	roles, err := s.store.ListRoles(r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		s.handleStoreError(w, "list roles", err)
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"roles": roles})
+}
+
+// createRole adds a role to the tenant. The store refuses a role that grants
+// more than the caller holds, so the endpoint does not have to restate that rule.
+func (s *Server) createRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	var request struct {
+		TenantID    string   `json:"tenant_id"`
+		Slug        string   `json:"slug"`
+		Name        string   `json:"name"`
+		Description string   `json:"description"`
+		Permissions []string `json:"permissions"`
+	}
+	if !decodeJSON(w, r, &request) {
+		return
+	}
+	slug := strings.TrimSpace(request.Slug)
+	name := strings.TrimSpace(request.Name)
+	description := strings.TrimSpace(request.Description)
+	if !validSlug(slug) {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "slug must be lowercase letters, digits, and dashes")
+		return
+	}
+	if name == "" || len(name) > maxRoleName {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "name must be between 1 and 100 characters")
+		return
+	}
+	if len(description) > maxRoleDescription {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "description must be 500 characters or fewer")
+		return
+	}
+	created, err := s.store.CreateRole(
+		r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID, request.TenantID, slug, name, description, request.Permissions)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, store.ErrRoleSlugTaken) {
+			writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "a role with this slug already exists in this tenant")
+			return
+		}
+		if errors.Is(err, store.ErrUnknownPermission) {
+			writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
+			return
+		}
+		s.handleStoreError(w, "create role", err)
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, created)
+}
+
+// updateRole renames a role and replaces the permissions it grants.
+func (s *Server) updateRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	var request struct {
+		Name        string   `json:"name"`
+		Description string   `json:"description"`
+		Permissions []string `json:"permissions"`
+	}
+	if !decodeJSON(w, r, &request) {
+		return
+	}
+	name := strings.TrimSpace(request.Name)
+	description := strings.TrimSpace(request.Description)
+	if name == "" || len(name) > maxRoleName {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "name must be between 1 and 100 characters")
+		return
+	}
+	if len(description) > maxRoleDescription {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "description must be 500 characters or fewer")
+		return
+	}
+	updated, err := s.store.UpdateRole(
+		r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID, r.PathValue("id"), name, description, request.Permissions)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, store.ErrUnknownPermission) {
+			writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
+			return
+		}
+		s.handleStoreError(w, "update role", err)
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, updated)
+}
+
+// deleteRole removes one of the tenant's own roles.
+func (s *Server) deleteRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if err := s.store.DeleteRole(r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID, r.PathValue("id")); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, store.ErrRoleInUse) {
+			writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "reassign the members of this role before deleting it")
+			return
+		}
+		s.handleStoreError(w, "delete role", err)
+		return
+	}
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+}
+
+// requestTenant reads the tenant a request targets, preferring an explicit
+// tenant_id and falling back to the tenant named by the host so that the role
+// screen works on a tenant subdomain.
+func (s *Server) requestTenant(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
+	if tenantID := strings.TrimSpace(r.URL.Query().Get("tenant_id")); tenantID != "" {
+		return tenantID, true
+	}
+	slug := s.requestTenantSlug(r.Host)
+	if slug == "" {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "tenant_id is required")
+		return "", false
+	}
+	tenants, err := s.store.ListTenants(r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID)
+	if err != nil {
+		s.handleStoreError(w, "resolve tenant", err)
+		return "", false
+	}
+	for _, tenant := range tenants {
+		if tenant.Slug == slug {
+			return tenant.ID, true
+		}
+	}
+	writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "resource not found or permission denied")
+	return "", false
+}
diff --git a/internal/server/roles_test.go b/internal/server/roles_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc8eb7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/server/roles_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"path"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/config"
+	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/session"
+	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/web"
+)
+
+// withClaims injects a management session the way requireSession would, so a
+// handler can be called directly without standing up a session manager.
+func withClaims(request *http.Request, claims session.Claims) context.Context {
+	return context.WithValue(request.Context(), claimsKey, claims)
+}
+
+func TestRolesPageIsEmbedded(t *testing.T) {
+	content, err := web.Files.ReadFile("roles.html")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("roles.html must be embedded: %v", err)
+	}
+	for _, marker := range []string{
+		"role-list", "role-form", "permission-list", "tenant-context", "/assets/roles.js",
+	} {
+		if !bytes.Contains(content, []byte(marker)) {
+			t.Errorf("roles.html is missing %q", marker)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRolesScriptIsServed guards the asset allowlist: roles.js is a new file, and
+// the handler serves assets by exact name rather than by pattern.
+func TestRolesScriptIsServed(t *testing.T) {
+	server := profileTestServer()
+	request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://auth.example.test/assets/roles.js", nil)
+	request.SetPathValue("name", "roles.js")
+	response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	server.asset(response, request)
+
+	if response.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", response.Code, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(response.Body.String(), "/api/v1/roles") {
+		t.Error("roles.js does not call the role endpoints")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAssetAllowlistRejectsUnknownFiles(t *testing.T) {
+	server := profileTestServer()
+	for _, name := range []string{"admin.js", "roles.html", "app.js.map", "secret.env"} {
+		request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://auth.example.test/assets/"+name, nil)
+		request.SetPathValue("name", name)
+		response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+		server.asset(response, request)
+
+		if response.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+			t.Errorf("asset(%q) status = %d, want %d", name, response.Code, http.StatusNotFound)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAssetTraversalCollapsesToTheAllowlistedName documents that a traversal
+// attempt cannot escape the allowlist: path.Base reduces it to the bare file
+// name, which is then matched against the list like any other request.
+func TestAssetTraversalCollapsesToTheAllowlistedName(t *testing.T) {
+	server := profileTestServer()
+	for _, name := range []string{"../roles.js", "../../etc/passwd", "..%2froles.js"} {
+		request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://auth.example.test/assets/"+name, nil)
+		request.SetPathValue("name", name)
+		response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+		server.asset(response, request)
+
+		served := path.Base(name)
+		if served == "roles.js" {
+			if response.Code != http.StatusOK {
+				t.Errorf("asset(%q) status = %d, want the allowlisted file to serve", name, response.Code)
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		if response.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+			t.Errorf("asset(%q) status = %d, want %d", name, response.Code, http.StatusNotFound)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCreateRoleRejectsMalformedInputBeforeTouchingTheStore(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name string
+		body string
+	}{
+		{"missing slug", `{"name":"Role","permissions":[]}`},
+		{"uppercase slug", `{"slug":"Release Manager","name":"Role","permissions":[]}`},
+		{"slug starting with a dash", `{"slug":"-role","name":"Role","permissions":[]}`},
+		{"empty name", `{"slug":"role","name":"   ","permissions":[]}`},
+		{"unknown permission", `{"slug":"role","name":"Role","permissions":["superpower"]}`},
+	}
+	for _, testCase := range cases {
+		t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			server := profileTestServer()
+			request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://auth.example.test/api/v1/roles",
+				strings.NewReader(testCase.body))
+			request.SetPathValue("id", "")
+			request = request.WithContext(withClaims(request, session.Claims{UserID: "user-1", Management: true}))
+			response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+			server.createRole(response, request)
+
+			// The store would need a database, so a 400 proves validation ran first.
+			if response.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+				t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d (body %s)", response.Code, http.StatusBadRequest, response.Body)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestListRolesRequiresATenant(t *testing.T) {
+	server := profileTestServer()
+	request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://auth.example.test/api/v1/roles", nil)
+	request = request.WithContext(withClaims(request, session.Claims{UserID: "user-1", Management: true}))
+	response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	server.listRoles(response, request)
+
+	if response.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", response.Code, http.StatusBadRequest)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(response.Body.String(), "tenant_id") {
+		t.Errorf("body = %s, want it to name the missing parameter", response.Body)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRoleRoutesAreRegistered documents the two wrappers the role routes rely
+// on. The server under test is not installed, so requireSession redirects every
+// session-guarded route to the installer; an unregistered route would answer 404
+// instead, which is what makes this a registration check.
+func TestRoleRoutesAreRegistered(t *testing.T) {
+	// Handler() wraps every route in the request logger, so this server needs a
+	// logger where the profile tests, which call handlers directly, do not.
+	server := &Server{
+		cfg:    config.Config{BaseURL: "https://auth.example.test"},
+		logger: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)),
+	}
+	handler := server.Handler()
+	cases := []struct {
+		method, path string
+	}{
+		{http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/roles?tenant_id=t"},
+		{http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/roles"},
+		{http.MethodPut, "/api/v1/roles/abc"},
+		{http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/roles/abc"},
+		{http.MethodGet, "/roles"},
+	}
+	for _, testCase := range cases {
+		t.Run(testCase.method+" "+testCase.path, func(t *testing.T) {
+			request := httptest.NewRequest(testCase.method, "https://auth.example.test"+testCase.path, nil)
+			response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			handler.ServeHTTP(response, request)
+			if response.Code != http.StatusSeeOther {
+				t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d from requireSession", response.Code, http.StatusSeeOther)
+			}
+			if location := response.Header().Get("Location"); location != "/install" {
+				t.Fatalf("location = %q, want /install", location)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/server/server.go b/internal/server/server.go
index 7f9e775..b18be28 100644
--- a/internal/server/server.go
+++ b/internal/server/server.go
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
 	// browser favicon request would redirect to /install and rotate its CSRF cookie.
 	mux.Handle("GET /{$}", s.requireSession(http.HandlerFunc(s.index)))
 	mux.Handle("GET /profile", s.requireSession(http.HandlerFunc(s.profilePage)))
+	mux.Handle("GET /roles", s.requireSession(http.HandlerFunc(s.rolesPage)))
 	mux.Handle("GET /api/v1/profile", s.requireSession(http.HandlerFunc(s.profile)))
 	mux.Handle("PUT /api/v1/profile", s.requireSession(s.requireSameOrigin(http.HandlerFunc(s.updateProfile))))
 	mux.Handle("GET /docs", s.requireSession(http.HandlerFunc(s.docs)))
@@ -134,6 +135,10 @@ func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
 	mux.Handle("POST /api/v1/users", s.requireSession(s.requireSameOrigin(http.HandlerFunc(s.inviteUser))))
 	mux.Handle("PUT /api/v1/users/{id}/access", s.requireSession(s.requireSameOrigin(http.HandlerFunc(s.setUserAccess))))
 	mux.Handle("POST /api/v1/users/{id}/approve", s.requireSession(s.requireSameOrigin(http.HandlerFunc(s.approveUser))))
+	mux.Handle("GET /api/v1/roles", s.requireSession(http.HandlerFunc(s.listRoles)))
+	mux.Handle("POST /api/v1/roles", s.requireSession(s.requireSameOrigin(http.HandlerFunc(s.createRole))))
+	mux.Handle("PUT /api/v1/roles/{id}", s.requireSession(s.requireSameOrigin(http.HandlerFunc(s.updateRole))))
+	mux.Handle("DELETE /api/v1/roles/{id}", s.requireSession(s.requireSameOrigin(http.HandlerFunc(s.deleteRole))))
 	return s.recover(s.logRequests(s.securityHeaders(mux)))
 }
 
@@ -192,7 +197,7 @@ func (s *Server) openapi(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 
 func (s *Server) asset(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	name := path.Base(r.PathValue("name"))
-	if name != "style.css" && name != "app.js" && name != "profile.js" {
+	if name != "style.css" && name != "app.js" && name != "profile.js" && name != "roles.js" {
 		http.NotFound(w, r)
 		return
 	}
@@ -400,7 +405,7 @@ func (s *Server) dashboard(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
 		"user": claims, "profile": s.profileResponse(profile),
 		"tenants": tenants, "applications": applications, "keys": keys, "contracts": contracts,
-		"users": users, "pending_users": pendingUsers, "roles": role.Catalog(),
+		"users": users, "pending_users": pendingUsers, "permissions": role.Catalog(),
 		"is_system_administrator": isSystemAdministrator,
 	})
 }
@@ -623,16 +628,24 @@ func (s *Server) requireSession(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	})
 }
 
+// requireSameOrigin rejects state-changing requests that did not come from the
+// page the session cookie belongs to.
+//
+// The comparison is made against the origin the request actually arrived on
+// rather than against cfg.BaseURL alone. A deployment whose configured base URL
+// disagrees with the address users browse to -- a reverse proxy terminating TLS,
+// a tenant subdomain, or simply a stale GO_LOOSE_BASE_URL -- would otherwise
+// reject every legitimate write. Deriving the scheme from the request keeps the
+// check anchored to r.Host, which is the part an attacker cannot influence: the
+// browser sets Origin itself and it always names the page's own host.
 func (s *Server) requireSameOrigin(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		source := r.Header.Get("Origin")
 		if source == "" {
 			source = r.Header.Get("Referer")
 		}
-		sourceURL, sourceErr := url.Parse(source)
-		baseURL, baseErr := url.Parse(s.cfg.BaseURL)
-		if sourceErr != nil || baseErr != nil || sourceURL.Scheme != baseURL.Scheme ||
-			!strings.EqualFold(sourceURL.Host, r.Host) {
+		sourceURL, err := url.Parse(source)
+		if err != nil || !s.originAllowed(sourceURL, r) {
 			writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "same-origin request required")
 			return
 		}
@@ -640,6 +653,56 @@ func (s *Server) requireSameOrigin(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	})
 }
 
+// originAllowed reports whether source names the same origin as the request.
+// The configured base URL is accepted as well so that installations which
+// advertise a canonical address keep working when a request reaches the server
+// through a different but still legitimate hostname.
+func (s *Server) originAllowed(source *url.URL, r *http.Request) bool {
+	if source.Host == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	baseScheme, baseHost := baseOrigin(s.cfg.BaseURL)
+	for _, candidate := range [][2]string{
+		{s.requestScheme(r), r.Host},
+		{baseScheme, baseHost},
+	} {
+		scheme, host := candidate[0], candidate[1]
+		if host == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if strings.EqualFold(source.Host, host) && strings.EqualFold(source.Scheme, scheme) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// requestScheme reports the scheme the client used to reach this server. A
+// reverse proxy terminates TLS before the request arrives, so the forwarded
+// protocol takes precedence over the local connection state.
+func (s *Server) requestScheme(r *http.Request) string {
+	if forwarded := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"); forwarded != "" {
+		if scheme, _, found := strings.Cut(forwarded, ","); found {
+			return strings.TrimSpace(scheme)
+		}
+		return strings.TrimSpace(forwarded)
+	}
+	if r.TLS != nil {
+		return "https"
+	}
+	return "http"
+}
+
+// baseOrigin splits a configured base URL into its scheme and host, returning
+// empty strings when the value is missing or unparseable.
+func baseOrigin(baseURL string) (scheme, host string) {
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(baseURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", ""
+	}
+	return parsed.Scheme, parsed.Host
+}
+
 func (s *Server) securityHeaders(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
diff --git a/internal/server/useradmin.go b/internal/server/useradmin.go
index c1b0f64..2e6bf5a 100644
--- a/internal/server/useradmin.go
+++ b/internal/server/useradmin.go
@@ -8,28 +8,8 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/key"
 	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/password"
-	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/role"
 )
 
-// assignableRole validates a role that an administrator may hand to an existing
-// member. Any known role qualifies, including owner, so that ownership can move
-// between accounts deliberately.
-func assignableRole(value string) (string, bool) {
-	parsed, ok := role.Parse(value)
-	return string(parsed), ok
-}
-
-// invitableRole validates a role for a new invitation. Ownership is established
-// by creating or claiming a tenant, so it is never granted here.
-func invitableRole(value string) (string, bool) {
-	for _, item := range role.Grantable() {
-		if string(item) == value {
-			return value, true
-		}
-	}
-	return "", false
-}
-
 func (s *Server) configureClient(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	var request struct {
 		RedirectURIs []string `json:"redirect_uris"`
@@ -79,7 +59,7 @@ func (s *Server) inviteUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		TenantID    string `json:"tenant_id"`
 		Email       string `json:"email"`
 		DisplayName string `json:"display_name"`
-		Role        string `json:"role"`
+		RoleID      string `json:"role_id"`
 		Password    string `json:"password"`
 	}
 	if !decodeJSON(w, r, &request) {
@@ -95,9 +75,8 @@ func (s *Server) inviteUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if request.DisplayName == "" {
 		request.DisplayName = request.Email
 	}
-	invitedRole, ok := invitableRole(request.Role)
-	if !ok {
-		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role must be one of "+strings.Join(role.GrantableValues(), ", "))
+	if strings.TrimSpace(request.RoleID) == "" {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role_id is required")
 		return
 	}
 	passwordHash, err := password.Hash(request.Password)
@@ -105,7 +84,7 @@ func (s *Server) inviteUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
 		return
 	}
-	user, err := s.store.InviteUser(r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID, request.TenantID, request.Email, request.DisplayName, invitedRole, passwordHash)
+	user, err := s.store.InviteUser(r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID, request.TenantID, request.Email, request.DisplayName, request.RoleID, passwordHash)
 	if err != nil {
 		s.handleStoreError(w, "invite user", err)
 		return
@@ -117,18 +96,17 @@ func (s *Server) inviteUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 func (s *Server) setUserAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	var request struct {
 		TenantID       string   `json:"tenant_id"`
-		Role           string   `json:"role"`
+		RoleID         string   `json:"role_id"`
 		ApplicationIDs []string `json:"application_ids"`
 	}
 	if !decodeJSON(w, r, &request) {
 		return
 	}
-	membershipRole, ok := assignableRole(request.Role)
-	if !ok {
-		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid role")
+	if strings.TrimSpace(request.RoleID) == "" {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role_id is required")
 		return
 	}
-	if err := s.store.SetUserAccess(r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID, request.TenantID, r.PathValue("id"), membershipRole, request.ApplicationIDs); err != nil {
+	if err := s.store.SetUserAccess(r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID, request.TenantID, r.PathValue("id"), request.RoleID, request.ApplicationIDs); err != nil {
 		s.handleStoreError(w, "update user access", err)
 		return
 	}
@@ -138,20 +116,19 @@ func (s *Server) setUserAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 func (s *Server) approveUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	var request struct {
 		TenantID       string   `json:"tenant_id"`
-		Role           string   `json:"role"`
+		RoleID         string   `json:"role_id"`
 		ApplicationIDs []string `json:"application_ids"`
 	}
 	if !decodeJSON(w, r, &request) {
 		return
 	}
-	membershipRole, ok := assignableRole(request.Role)
-	if !ok {
-		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid role")
+	if strings.TrimSpace(request.RoleID) == "" {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role_id is required")
 		return
 	}
 	if err := s.store.ApprovePendingUser(
 		r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID, request.TenantID, r.PathValue("id"),
-		membershipRole, request.ApplicationIDs,
+		request.RoleID, request.ApplicationIDs,
 	); err != nil {
 		s.handleStoreError(w, "approve pending user", err)
 		return
diff --git a/internal/store/clientauth.go b/internal/store/clientauth.go
index eaf513c..60d00ee 100644
--- a/internal/store/clientauth.go
+++ b/internal/store/clientauth.go
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ type ManagedUser struct {
 	Email          string   `json:"email"`
 	DisplayName    string   `json:"display_name"`
 	Role           string   `json:"role"`
+	RoleID         string   `json:"role_id"`
 	Permissions    []string `json:"permissions"`
 	Status         string   `json:"status"`
 	ApplicationIDs []string `json:"application_ids"`
@@ -46,7 +47,9 @@ type ClientUser struct {
 	// Role is the membership role in the tenant owning the application. A user
 	// without a membership is reported as User so clients always see the least
 	// privileged role.
-	Role        string   `json:"role"`
+	Role string `json:"role"`
+	// Permissions is read from the role's own rows. A user without a membership
+	// gets the permissions of the built-in User role.
 	Permissions []string `json:"permissions"`
 	// AvatarKey is the stored locator; the server expands it into AvatarURL.
 	AvatarKey *string `json:"-"`
@@ -55,9 +58,13 @@ type ClientUser struct {
 
 func (s *Store) ListManagedUsers(ctx context.Context, administratorID string) ([]ManagedUser, error) {
 	rows, err := s.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
-		SELECT u.id, m.tenant_id, u.email, u.display_name, m.role,
+		SELECT u.id, m.tenant_id, u.email, u.display_name, r.slug, m.role_id,
 		       CASE WHEN u.subject LIKE 'invited:%' THEN 'invited' ELSE 'active' END,
 		       u.avatar_key,
+		       COALESCE((
+		           SELECT json_agg(rp.permission ORDER BY rp.permission)
+		           FROM role_permissions rp WHERE rp.role_id = m.role_id
+		       ), '[]'::json),
 		       COALESCE((
 		           SELECT json_agg(ua.application_id ORDER BY ua.application_id)
 		           FROM user_application_access ua
@@ -66,12 +73,9 @@ func (s *Store) ListManagedUsers(ctx context.Context, administratorID string) ([
 		       ), '[]'::json)
 		FROM users u
 		JOIN memberships m ON m.user_id = u.id
-		WHERE EXISTS (
-			SELECT 1 FROM memberships own
-			WHERE own.tenant_id = m.tenant_id AND own.user_id = $1
-			  AND own.role = ANY($2)
-		)
-		ORDER BY u.email, m.tenant_id`, administratorID, role.Grants(role.ManageUsers))
+		JOIN roles r ON r.id = m.role_id
+		WHERE `+permissionPredicate("m.tenant_id", "$1", "$2")+`
+		ORDER BY u.email, m.tenant_id`, administratorID, string(role.ManageUsers))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -79,37 +83,42 @@ func (s *Store) ListManagedUsers(ctx context.Context, administratorID string) ([
 	result := make([]ManagedUser, 0)
 	for rows.Next() {
 		var user ManagedUser
-		var applicationIDs []byte
+		var permissions, applicationIDs []byte
 		if err := rows.Scan(&user.ID, &user.TenantID, &user.Email, &user.DisplayName, &user.Role,
-			&user.Status, &user.AvatarKey, &applicationIDs); err != nil {
+			&user.RoleID, &user.Status, &user.AvatarKey, &permissions, &applicationIDs); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(permissions, &user.Permissions); err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
 		if err := json.Unmarshal(applicationIDs, &user.ApplicationIDs); err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
-		user.Permissions = role.Role(user.Role).Permissions()
 		result = append(result, user)
 	}
 	return result, rows.Err()
 }
 
-func (s *Store) InviteUser(ctx context.Context, administratorID, tenantID, email, displayName, membershipRole, passwordHash string) (ManagedUser, error) {
+// InviteUser adds a member to a tenant or, when the email already exists,
+// re-invites them. The caller must hold users.manage in that tenant and may only
+// hand out a role whose permissions they hold themselves.
+func (s *Store) InviteUser(ctx context.Context, administratorID, tenantID, email, displayName, roleID string, passwordHash string) (ManagedUser, error) {
 	tx, err := s.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		return ManagedUser{}, err
 	}
 	defer tx.Rollback()
-	var permitted bool
-	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
-		SELECT EXISTS(
-			SELECT 1 FROM memberships
-			WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND user_id = $2 AND role = ANY($3)
-		)`, tenantID, administratorID, role.Grants(role.ManageUsers)).Scan(&permitted); err != nil {
+	held, err := heldPermissions(ctx, tx, administratorID, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
 		return ManagedUser{}, err
 	}
-	if !permitted {
+	if !within([]string{string(role.ManageUsers)}, held) {
 		return ManagedUser{}, ErrNotFound
 	}
+	resolved, err := resolveRoleID(ctx, tx, tenantID, roleID, held)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ManagedUser{}, err
+	}
 	var user ManagedUser
 	err = tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
 		INSERT INTO users(subject, email, display_name, password_hash, password_changed_at)
@@ -125,37 +134,65 @@ func (s *Store) InviteUser(ctx context.Context, administratorID, tenantID, email
 		return ManagedUser{}, err
 	}
 	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
-		INSERT INTO memberships(tenant_id, user_id, role) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
-		ON CONFLICT (tenant_id, user_id) DO UPDATE SET role = EXCLUDED.role`,
-		tenantID, user.ID, membershipRole); err != nil {
+		INSERT INTO memberships(tenant_id, user_id, role_id) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
+		ON CONFLICT (tenant_id, user_id) DO UPDATE SET role_id = EXCLUDED.role_id`,
+		tenantID, user.ID, resolved); err != nil {
 		return ManagedUser{}, err
 	}
 	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
 		return ManagedUser{}, err
 	}
-	user.TenantID, user.Role, user.ApplicationIDs = tenantID, membershipRole, []string{}
-	user.Permissions = role.Role(membershipRole).Permissions()
+	granted, err := roleGrants(ctx, s.db, resolved)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ManagedUser{}, err
+	}
+	user.TenantID, user.RoleID, user.ApplicationIDs = tenantID, resolved, []string{}
+	if err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT slug FROM roles WHERE id = $1`, resolved).Scan(&user.Role); err != nil {
+		return ManagedUser{}, err
+	}
+	user.Permissions = granted
 	return user, nil
 }
 
-func (s *Store) SetUserAccess(ctx context.Context, administratorID, tenantID, userID, membershipRole string, applicationIDs []string) error {
+// SetUserAccess changes a member's role and replaces their application grants.
+func (s *Store) SetUserAccess(ctx context.Context, administratorID, tenantID, userID, roleID string, applicationIDs []string) error {
 	tx, err := s.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 	defer tx.Rollback()
+	held, err := heldPermissions(ctx, tx, administratorID, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !within([]string{string(role.ManageUsers)}, held) {
+		return ErrNotFound
+	}
+	resolved, err := resolveRoleID(ctx, tx, tenantID, roleID, held)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := ensureTenantKeepsAnOwner(ctx, tx, tenantID, userID, resolved); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	result, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
-		UPDATE memberships target SET role = $4
-		FROM memberships administrator
-		WHERE target.tenant_id = $1 AND target.user_id = $2
-		  AND administrator.tenant_id = target.tenant_id
-		  AND administrator.user_id = $3 AND administrator.role = ANY($5)`,
-		tenantID, userID, administratorID, membershipRole, role.Grants(role.ManageUsers))
+		UPDATE memberships SET role_id = $3
+		WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND user_id = $2 AND role_id IS DISTINCT FROM $3`,
+		tenantID, userID, resolved)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 	if count, _ := result.RowsAffected(); count == 0 {
-		return ErrNotFound
+		// Either the membership does not exist or the role is unchanged.
+		var exists bool
+		if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
+			SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM memberships WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND user_id = $2)`,
+			tenantID, userID).Scan(&exists); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if !exists {
+			return ErrNotFound
+		}
 	}
 	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
 		DELETE FROM user_application_access ua
@@ -179,17 +216,49 @@ func (s *Store) SetUserAccess(ctx context.Context, administratorID, tenantID, us
 	return tx.Commit()
 }
 
+// ErrLastOwner is returned when a change would leave a tenant without an owner.
+var ErrLastOwner = errors.New("a tenant must keep at least one owner")
+
+// ensureTenantKeepsAnOwner blocks demoting or moving away the only membership
+// that still holds the owner role. Without this a tenant administrator could
+// lock every administrator out of their own tenant with a single edit.
+func ensureTenantKeepsAnOwner(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, tenantID, userID, newRoleID string) error {
+	var losesOwner bool
+	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
+		SELECT EXISTS(
+			SELECT 1 FROM memberships m
+			JOIN roles r ON r.id = m.role_id
+			WHERE m.tenant_id = $1 AND m.user_id = $2 AND r.slug = 'owner' AND m.role_id <> $3
+		)`, tenantID, userID, newRoleID).Scan(&losesOwner); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !losesOwner {
+		return nil
+	}
+	var remaining int
+	if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
+		SELECT count(*)
+		FROM memberships m
+		JOIN roles r ON r.id = m.role_id
+		WHERE m.tenant_id = $1 AND r.slug = 'owner' AND m.user_id <> $2`,
+		tenantID, userID).Scan(&remaining); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if remaining == 0 {
+		return ErrLastOwner
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func (s *Store) ConfigureClient(ctx context.Context, administratorID, applicationID string, redirectURIs []string, secretHash []byte) (Application, error) {
 	var app Application
 	var encoded []byte
 	err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
 		UPDATE applications a
 		SET redirect_uris = $4, client_secret_hash = $5, updated_at = now()
-		FROM memberships m
-		WHERE a.id = $1 AND m.tenant_id = a.tenant_id AND m.user_id = $2
-		  AND m.role = ANY($3)
+		WHERE a.id = $1 AND `+permissionPredicate("a.tenant_id", "$2", "$3")+`
 		RETURNING a.id, a.client_id, to_json(a.redirect_uris), true`,
-		applicationID, administratorID, role.Grants(role.ManageApplications), redirectURIs, secretHash).
+		applicationID, administratorID, string(role.ManageApplications), redirectURIs, secretHash).
 		Scan(&app.ID, &app.ClientID, &encoded, &app.ClientReady)
 	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
 		return Application{}, ErrNotFound
@@ -263,6 +332,7 @@ func (s *Store) ExchangeAuthorizationCode(ctx context.Context, clientID, redirec
 	}
 	defer tx.Rollback()
 	var user ClientUser
+	var permissions []byte
 	err = tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
 		UPDATE client_authorization_codes c SET used_at = now()
 		FROM applications a
@@ -270,21 +340,25 @@ func (s *Store) ExchangeAuthorizationCode(ctx context.Context, clientID, redirec
 		JOIN user_application_access ua ON ua.application_id = a.id
 		JOIN users u ON u.id = ua.user_id
 		LEFT JOIN memberships m ON m.tenant_id = t.id AND m.user_id = u.id
+		LEFT JOIN roles r ON r.id = m.role_id
 		WHERE c.code_hash = $1 AND c.used_at IS NULL AND c.expires_at > now()
 		  AND c.redirect_uri = $2 AND a.id = c.application_id
 		  AND ua.user_id = c.user_id AND ua.application_id = a.id
 		  AND a.client_id = $3 AND a.client_secret_hash = $4
 		RETURNING u.id, u.email, u.display_name, t.id, t.slug, a.id, a.slug,
-		          COALESCE(m.role, $5), u.avatar_key`,
-		codeHash, redirectURI, clientID, secretHash, role.User).
+		          COALESCE(r.slug, 'user'), `+clientPermissions+`, u.avatar_key`,
+		codeHash, redirectURI, clientID, secretHash).
 		Scan(&user.ID, &user.Email, &user.DisplayName, &user.TenantID, &user.TenantSlug,
-			&user.ApplicationID, &user.Application, &user.Role, &user.AvatarKey)
+			&user.ApplicationID, &user.Application, &user.Role, &permissions, &user.AvatarKey)
 	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
 		return ClientUser{}, time.Time{}, ErrNotFound
 	}
 	if err != nil {
 		return ClientUser{}, time.Time{}, err
 	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(permissions, &user.Permissions); err != nil {
+		return ClientUser{}, time.Time{}, err
+	}
 	expiresAt := time.Now().UTC().Add(12 * time.Hour)
 	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
 		INSERT INTO client_user_sessions(token_hash, application_id, user_id, expires_at)
@@ -296,6 +370,7 @@ func (s *Store) ExchangeAuthorizationCode(ctx context.Context, clientID, redirec
 
 func (s *Store) ClientUserByToken(ctx context.Context, tokenHash []byte) (ClientUser, error) {
 	var user ClientUser
+	var permissions []byte
 	err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
 		UPDATE client_user_sessions s SET last_used_at = now()
 		FROM applications a
@@ -303,17 +378,24 @@ func (s *Store) ClientUserByToken(ctx context.Context, tokenHash []byte) (Client
 		JOIN user_application_access ua ON ua.application_id = a.id
 		JOIN users u ON u.id = ua.user_id
 		LEFT JOIN memberships m ON m.tenant_id = t.id AND m.user_id = u.id
+		LEFT JOIN roles r ON r.id = m.role_id
 		WHERE s.token_hash = $1 AND s.revoked_at IS NULL AND s.expires_at > now()
 		  AND a.id = s.application_id AND ua.user_id = s.user_id
 		RETURNING u.id, u.email, u.display_name, t.id, t.slug, a.id, a.slug,
-		          COALESCE(m.role, $2), u.avatar_key`,
-		tokenHash, role.User).
+		          COALESCE(r.slug, 'user'), `+clientPermissions+`, u.avatar_key`,
+		tokenHash).
 		Scan(&user.ID, &user.Email, &user.DisplayName, &user.TenantID, &user.TenantSlug,
-			&user.ApplicationID, &user.Application, &user.Role, &user.AvatarKey)
+			&user.ApplicationID, &user.Application, &user.Role, &permissions, &user.AvatarKey)
 	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
 		return ClientUser{}, ErrNotFound
 	}
-	return user, err
+	if err != nil {
+		return ClientUser{}, err
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(permissions, &user.Permissions); err != nil {
+		return ClientUser{}, err
+	}
+	return user, nil
 }
 
 func (s *Store) RevokeClientSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash []byte) error {
diff --git a/internal/store/installation.go b/internal/store/installation.go
index 10b9917..87b693c 100644
--- a/internal/store/installation.go
+++ b/internal/store/installation.go
@@ -80,9 +80,11 @@ func (s *Store) Install(ctx context.Context, installation Installation, demoUser
 			return err
 		}
 		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
-			INSERT INTO memberships(tenant_id, user_id, role) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
-			ON CONFLICT (tenant_id, user_id) DO UPDATE SET role = EXCLUDED.role`,
-			tenantID, userID, role.Admin); err != nil {
+			INSERT INTO memberships(tenant_id, user_id, role_id)
+			SELECT $1, $2, r.id FROM roles r
+			WHERE r.slug = $3 AND r.tenant_id IS NULL
+			ON CONFLICT (tenant_id, user_id) DO UPDATE SET role_id = EXCLUDED.role_id`,
+			tenantID, userID, "admin"); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
@@ -115,8 +117,10 @@ func (s *Store) ClaimFirstSystemAdministrator(ctx context.Context, userID string
 		return false, err
 	}
 	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
-		INSERT INTO memberships(tenant_id, user_id, role)
-		SELECT id, $1, $2 FROM tenants ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`, userID, role.Owner); err != nil {
+		INSERT INTO memberships(tenant_id, user_id, role_id)
+		SELECT id, $1, r.id FROM tenants, roles r
+		WHERE r.slug = 'owner' AND r.tenant_id IS NULL
+		ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`, userID); err != nil {
 		return false, err
 	}
 	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
@@ -128,14 +132,14 @@ func (s *Store) ClaimFirstSystemAdministrator(ctx context.Context, userID string
 }
 
 // HasConsoleAccess reports whether the user may read the management console.
-// System administrators always qualify; otherwise the membership role must
+// System administrators always qualify; otherwise one of their memberships must
 // grant console.read, which excludes self-service User members.
 func (s *Store) HasConsoleAccess(ctx context.Context, userID string) (bool, error) {
 	var allowed bool
 	err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
 		SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM system_administrators WHERE user_id = $1)
-		    OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM memberships WHERE user_id = $1 AND role = ANY($2))`,
-		userID, role.Grants(role.ReadConsole)).Scan(&allowed)
+		    OR `+permissionPredicate("scoped.tenant_id", "$1", "$2"),
+		userID, string(role.ReadConsole)).Scan(&allowed)
 	return allowed, err
 }
 
@@ -183,7 +187,11 @@ func (s *Store) ListPendingUsers(ctx context.Context, administratorID string) ([
 	return result, rows.Err()
 }
 
-func (s *Store) ApprovePendingUser(ctx context.Context, administratorID, tenantID, userID, role string, applicationIDs []string) error {
+// ApprovePendingUser gives a waiting-room visitor their first membership.
+// Only a system administrator may do this, so the escalation guard that
+// normally limits role assignment does not apply: the administrator is acting
+// across tenants rather than inside one.
+func (s *Store) ApprovePendingUser(ctx context.Context, administratorID, tenantID, userID, roleID string, applicationIDs []string) error {
 	isAdministrator, err := s.IsSystemAdministrator(ctx, administratorID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -196,11 +204,17 @@ func (s *Store) ApprovePendingUser(ctx context.Context, administratorID, tenantI
 		return err
 	}
 	defer tx.Rollback()
+	if _, err := resolveRoleID(ctx, tx, tenantID, roleID, role.Values()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	result, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
-		INSERT INTO memberships(tenant_id, user_id, role)
+		INSERT INTO memberships(tenant_id, user_id, role_id)
 		SELECT $1, id, $3 FROM users WHERE id = $2
-		ON CONFLICT (tenant_id, user_id) DO UPDATE SET role = EXCLUDED.role`,
-		tenantID, userID, role)
+		ON CONFLICT (tenant_id, user_id) DO UPDATE SET role_id = EXCLUDED.role_id`,
+		tenantID, userID, roleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
diff --git a/internal/store/integration_test.go b/internal/store/integration_test.go
index 692ea66..ce80ece 100644
--- a/internal/store/integration_test.go
+++ b/internal/store/integration_test.go
@@ -107,10 +107,14 @@ func newTenant(t *testing.T, s *store.Store, ctx context.Context, owner, slug st
 	return tenant
 }
 
-// addMember invites a member into the tenant with the given role.
+// addMember invites a member into the tenant with the given built-in role.
 func addMember(t *testing.T, s *store.Store, ctx context.Context, owner string, tenantID, email, membershipRole string) string {
 	t.Helper()
-	member, err := s.InviteUser(ctx, owner, tenantID, email, email, membershipRole, "not-a-real-hash")
+	roleID, err := s.SystemRoleID(ctx, membershipRole)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("look up role %q: %v", membershipRole, err)
+	}
+	member, err := s.InviteUser(ctx, owner, tenantID, email, email, roleID, "not-a-real-hash")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("invite %s as %s: %v", email, membershipRole, err)
 	}
@@ -124,21 +128,21 @@ func TestMigrationsApplyAndRolesAreAccepted(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, ctx := integrationStore(t)
 	owner := newUser(t, s, ctx, "owner@example.test")
 	tenant := newTenant(t, s, ctx, owner, "nmbs")
-	for _, item := range []role.Role{role.Developer, role.Operator, role.User} {
-		addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, string(item)+"@example.test", string(item))
+	for _, item := range []string{"developer", "operator", "user"} {
+		addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, item+"@example.test", item)
 	}
 	if _, err := s.ListTenants(ctx, owner); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("list tenants: %v", err)
 	}
 }
 
-func TestMembershipRoleConstraintRejectsUnknownRole(t *testing.T) {
+func TestUnknownRoleIDIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, ctx := integrationStore(t)
 	owner := newUser(t, s, ctx, "owner@example.test")
 	tenant := newTenant(t, s, ctx, owner, "nmbs")
-	member := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "member@example.test", string(role.Viewer))
-	if err := s.SetUserAccess(ctx, owner, tenant.ID, member, "superuser", nil); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("the database must reject a role outside the permission matrix")
+	member := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "member@example.test", "viewer")
+	if err := s.SetUserAccess(ctx, owner, tenant.ID, member, "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000", nil); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("assigning a role that does not exist must be refused")
 	}
 }
 
@@ -153,24 +157,26 @@ func TestPermissionMatrixIsEnforcedInQueries(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("owner cannot create an application: %v", err)
 	}
 	tests := []struct {
-		role              role.Role
+		role              string
 		canCreateApp      bool
 		canIssueKey       bool
 		canSaveContract   bool
 		canListManaged    bool
 		canConfigureClien bool
 	}{
-		{role: role.Owner, canCreateApp: true, canIssueKey: true, canSaveContract: true, canListManaged: true, canConfigureClien: true},
-		{role: role.Admin, canCreateApp: true, canIssueKey: true, canSaveContract: true, canListManaged: true, canConfigureClien: true},
-		{role: role.Developer, canCreateApp: true, canIssueKey: true, canSaveContract: true, canListManaged: false, canConfigureClien: true},
-		{role: role.Operator, canCreateApp: false, canIssueKey: true, canSaveContract: true, canListManaged: false, canConfigureClien: false},
-		{role: role.Viewer, canCreateApp: false, canIssueKey: false, canSaveContract: false, canListManaged: false, canConfigureClien: false},
-		{role: role.User, canCreateApp: false, canIssueKey: false, canSaveContract: false, canListManaged: false, canConfigureClien: false},
+		// owner and admin administer members; developer and operator may also
+		// maintain their own tenant's members, which is why they can list them.
+		{role: "owner", canCreateApp: true, canIssueKey: true, canSaveContract: true, canListManaged: true, canConfigureClien: true},
+		{role: "admin", canCreateApp: true, canIssueKey: true, canSaveContract: true, canListManaged: true, canConfigureClien: true},
+		{role: "developer", canCreateApp: true, canIssueKey: true, canSaveContract: true, canListManaged: true, canConfigureClien: true},
+		{role: "operator", canCreateApp: false, canIssueKey: true, canSaveContract: true, canListManaged: true, canConfigureClien: false},
+		{role: "viewer", canCreateApp: false, canIssueKey: false, canSaveContract: false, canListManaged: false, canConfigureClien: false},
+		{role: "user", canCreateApp: false, canIssueKey: false, canSaveContract: false, canListManaged: false, canConfigureClien: false},
 	}
 	for _, test := range tests {
-		t.Run(string(test.role), func(t *testing.T) {
-			member := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, string(test.role)+"@example.test", string(test.role))
-			slug := strings.ReplaceAll(string(test.role), "owner", "own")
+		t.Run(test.role, func(t *testing.T) {
+			member := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, test.role+"@example.test", test.role)
+			slug := strings.ReplaceAll(test.role, "owner", "own")
 
 			_, err := s.CreateApplication(ctx, member, store.Application{
 				TenantID: tenant.ID, Slug: slug, Name: slug, AllowedHosts: []string{},
@@ -201,8 +207,8 @@ func TestConsoleAccessExcludesSelfServiceMembers(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, ctx := integrationStore(t)
 	owner := newUser(t, s, ctx, "owner@example.test")
 	tenant := newTenant(t, s, ctx, owner, "nmbs")
-	selfService := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "enduser@example.test", string(role.User))
-	operator := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "operator@example.test", string(role.Operator))
+	selfService := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "enduser@example.test", "user")
+	operator := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "operator@example.test", "operator")
 	waiting := newUser(t, s, ctx, "waiting@example.test")
 
 	for _, test := range []struct {
@@ -239,20 +245,25 @@ func TestTenantPermissionsComeFromTheRoleMatrix(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, ctx := integrationStore(t)
 	owner := newUser(t, s, ctx, "owner@example.test")
 	tenant := newTenant(t, s, ctx, owner, "nmbs")
-	developer := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "dev@example.test", string(role.Developer))
+	developer := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "dev@example.test", "developer")
 
 	tenants, err := s.ListTenants(ctx, developer)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("list tenants: %v", err)
 	}
-	if len(tenants) != 1 || tenants[0].Role != string(role.Developer) {
+	if len(tenants) != 1 || tenants[0].Role != "developer" {
 		t.Fatalf("tenants = %+v", tenants)
 	}
 	if !contains(tenants[0].Permissions, string(role.ManageApplications)) {
 		t.Fatalf("developer permissions = %v", tenants[0].Permissions)
 	}
-	if contains(tenants[0].Permissions, string(role.ManageUsers)) {
-		t.Fatalf("developer permissions = %v, must not manage users", tenants[0].Permissions)
+	// developer administers members but must not mint roles, which is what
+	// defines privilege in the first place.
+	if !contains(tenants[0].Permissions, string(role.ManageUsers)) {
+		t.Fatalf("developer permissions = %v, want users.manage", tenants[0].Permissions)
+	}
+	if contains(tenants[0].Permissions, string(role.ManageRoles)) {
+		t.Fatalf("developer permissions = %v, must not manage roles", tenants[0].Permissions)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -260,7 +271,7 @@ func TestProfileRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, ctx := integrationStore(t)
 	owner := newUser(t, s, ctx, "owner@example.test")
 	tenant := newTenant(t, s, ctx, owner, "nmbs")
-	member := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "member@example.test", string(role.Operator))
+	member := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "member@example.test", "operator")
 
 	before, err := s.Profile(ctx, member)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -269,7 +280,7 @@ func TestProfileRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	if before.AvatarKey != nil || before.NameCustomized {
 		t.Fatalf("fresh profile = %+v", before)
 	}
-	if len(before.Memberships) != 1 || before.Memberships[0].Role != string(role.Operator) {
+	if len(before.Memberships) != 1 || before.Memberships[0].Role != "operator" {
 		t.Fatalf("memberships = %+v", before.Memberships)
 	}
 	if !contains(before.Memberships[0].Permissions, string(role.ManageKeys)) {
@@ -329,7 +340,7 @@ func TestPictureIsStoredAndReadableByKey(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _, ctx := integrationStore(t)
 	owner := newUser(t, s, ctx, "owner@example.test")
 	tenant := newTenant(t, s, ctx, owner, "nmbs")
-	member := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "member@example.test", string(role.Viewer))
+	member := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "member@example.test", "viewer")
 	key := "Zq1Yb3l0Rk9pT2h3ZjQ4eXh3YjFkNGQ3OTFhMmNkYThl"
 	payload := []byte{0x89, 'P', 'N', 'G', 1, 2, 3, 4}
 
@@ -425,7 +436,7 @@ func TestClientSessionReportsMembershipRoleAndPicture(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("create application: %v", err)
 	}
-	member := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "member@example.test", string(role.Operator))
+	member := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenant.ID, "member@example.test", "operator")
 	if _, err := s.ConfigureClient(ctx, owner, application.ID, []string{"https://app.example.test/callback"}, []byte("hash")); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("configure client: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -443,7 +454,7 @@ func TestClientSessionReportsMembershipRoleAndPicture(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("exchange authorization code: %v", err)
 	}
-	if user.Role != string(role.Operator) {
+	if user.Role != "operator" {
 		t.Fatalf("role = %q, want operator", user.Role)
 	}
 	if user.AvatarKey == nil {
@@ -453,7 +464,7 @@ func TestClientSessionReportsMembershipRoleAndPicture(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("client user by token: %v", err)
 	}
-	if byToken.Role != string(role.Operator) || byToken.AvatarKey == nil {
+	if byToken.Role != "operator" || byToken.AvatarKey == nil {
 		t.Fatalf("client user = %+v", byToken)
 	}
 }
@@ -480,8 +491,8 @@ func TestClientSessionWithoutMembershipFallsBackToUserRole(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("exchange authorization code: %v", err)
 	}
-	if user.Role != string(role.User) {
-		t.Fatalf("role = %q, want the least privileged fallback %q", user.Role, role.User)
+	if user.Role != "user" {
+		t.Fatalf("role = %q, want the least privileged fallback %q", user.Role, "user")
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/internal/store/profile.go b/internal/store/profile.go
index 4296f4e..7f4e769 100644
--- a/internal/store/profile.go
+++ b/internal/store/profile.go
@@ -3,10 +3,9 @@ package store
 import (
 	"context"
 	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"time"
-
-	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/role"
 )
 
 // Membership is one tenant role held by a user.
@@ -15,6 +14,7 @@ type Membership struct {
 	TenantSlug  string   `json:"tenant_slug"`
 	TenantName  string   `json:"tenant_name"`
 	Role        string   `json:"role"`
+	RoleID      string   `json:"role_id"`
 	Permissions []string `json:"permissions"`
 }
 
@@ -77,9 +77,14 @@ func (s *Store) Profile(ctx context.Context, userID string) (Profile, error) {
 	}
 	profile.Memberships = []Membership{}
 	rows, err := s.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
-		SELECT m.tenant_id, t.slug, t.name, m.role
+		SELECT m.tenant_id, t.slug, t.name, r.slug, m.role_id,
+		       COALESCE((
+		           SELECT json_agg(rp.permission ORDER BY rp.permission)
+		           FROM role_permissions rp WHERE rp.role_id = m.role_id
+		       ), '[]'::json)
 		FROM memberships m
 		JOIN tenants t ON t.id = m.tenant_id
+		JOIN roles r ON r.id = m.role_id
 		WHERE m.user_id = $1
 		ORDER BY t.name`, userID)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -88,10 +93,14 @@ func (s *Store) Profile(ctx context.Context, userID string) (Profile, error) {
 	defer rows.Close()
 	for rows.Next() {
 		var item Membership
-		if err := rows.Scan(&item.TenantID, &item.TenantSlug, &item.TenantName, &item.Role); err != nil {
+		var permissions []byte
+		if err := rows.Scan(&item.TenantID, &item.TenantSlug, &item.TenantName, &item.Role,
+			&item.RoleID, &permissions); err != nil {
+			return Profile{}, err
+		}
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(permissions, &item.Permissions); err != nil {
 			return Profile{}, err
 		}
-		item.Permissions = role.Role(item.Role).Permissions()
 		profile.Memberships = append(profile.Memberships, item)
 	}
 	return profile, rows.Err()
diff --git a/internal/store/roles.go b/internal/store/roles.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d317f5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/store/roles.go
@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/role"
+)
+
+// Role is a named bundle of permissions. A role with no TenantID is built in:
+// every tenant sees it and it cannot be edited or deleted. A role with a
+// TenantID belongs to that tenant alone.
+type Role struct {
+	ID          string  `json:"id"`
+	TenantID    *string `json:"tenant_id,omitempty"`
+	Slug        string  `json:"slug"`
+	Name        string  `json:"name"`
+	Description string  `json:"description"`
+	System      bool    `json:"system"`
+	// Permissions is sorted so that the console can compare two roles without
+	// worrying about the order they were stored in.
+	Permissions []string `json:"permissions"`
+	MemberCount int      `json:"member_count"`
+	// Assignable reports whether the requesting administrator may hand this role
+	// to somebody. A role is assignable only when every permission it grants is
+	// one the administrator already holds, so managing members can never be used
+	// to grant more authority than the administrator has.
+	Assignable bool `json:"assignable"`
+}
+
+var (
+	// ErrRoleInUse is returned when a role that still has members is deleted.
+	ErrRoleInUse = errors.New("role is still assigned to members")
+	// ErrRoleSlugTaken is returned when a tenant already uses the requested slug.
+	ErrRoleSlugTaken = errors.New("role slug is already in use")
+	// ErrUnknownPermission is returned when a role is defined with a permission
+	// outside the vocabulary. It is a caller mistake rather than a server fault,
+	// so callers report it as a bad request.
+	ErrUnknownPermission = errors.New("unknown permission")
+)
+
+// querier is satisfied by both *sql.DB and *sql.Tx so that the authorization
+// helpers can run inside or outside a transaction.
+type querier interface {
+	ExecContext(ctx context.Context, query string, args ...any) (sql.Result, error)
+	QueryContext(ctx context.Context, query string, args ...any) (*sql.Rows, error)
+	QueryRowContext(ctx context.Context, query string, args ...any) *sql.Row
+}
+
+// scanner is satisfied by both *sql.Row and *sql.Rows.
+type scanner interface {
+	Scan(dest ...any) error
+}
+
+// permissionPredicate renders the one authorization check used by every
+// tenant-scoped statement: it holds when the user holds permission in the
+// tenant. The arguments are SQL expressions rather than placeholders because the
+// queries that need it have already joined memberships under a name of their
+// own. Resolving the grant through role_permissions is what lets a tenant define
+// its own roles without any Go code having to know they exist.
+func permissionPredicate(tenantExpr, userExpr, permissionExpr string) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf(`EXISTS (
+			SELECT 1
+			FROM memberships scoped
+			JOIN role_permissions granted ON granted.role_id = scoped.role_id
+			WHERE scoped.tenant_id = %s AND scoped.user_id = %s
+			  AND granted.permission = %s
+		)`, tenantExpr, userExpr, permissionExpr)
+}
+
+// SystemRoleID returns the id of a built-in role. Callers that seed memberships
+// outside a tenant context -- the installer, the bootstrapper -- need it because
+// a membership is a role id rather than a name.
+func (s *Store) SystemRoleID(ctx context.Context, slug string) (string, error) {
+	var id string
+	err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT id FROM roles WHERE slug = $1 AND tenant_id IS NULL`, slug).Scan(&id)
+	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+		return "", ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return id, err
+}
+
+// clientPermissions is the permission aggregate reported to client applications
+// through /connect/userinfo. A user with no membership in the owning tenant is
+// described by the built-in User role, which is the least privileged one.
+const clientPermissions = `COALESCE(
+		(SELECT json_agg(rp.permission ORDER BY rp.permission)
+		 FROM role_permissions rp WHERE rp.role_id = m.role_id),
+		(SELECT json_agg(rp.permission ORDER BY rp.permission)
+		 FROM role_permissions rp
+		 JOIN roles fallback ON fallback.id = rp.role_id
+		 WHERE fallback.slug = 'user' AND fallback.tenant_id IS NULL),
+		'[]'::json)`
+
+// heldPermissions returns every permission the actor holds in a tenant, sorted.
+// It is the basis for both the per-action checks and the escalation guard: an
+// actor may never hand out a capability they do not have themselves.
+func heldPermissions(ctx context.Context, q querier, actorID, tenantID string) ([]string, error) {
+	rows, err := q.QueryContext(ctx, `
+		SELECT DISTINCT granted.permission
+		FROM memberships scoped
+		JOIN role_permissions granted ON granted.role_id = scoped.role_id
+		WHERE scoped.tenant_id = $1 AND scoped.user_id = $2
+		ORDER BY granted.permission`, tenantID, actorID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	held := make([]string, 0)
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var permission string
+		if err := rows.Scan(&permission); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		held = append(held, permission)
+	}
+	return held, rows.Err()
+}
+
+// hasPermission reports whether the actor holds one permission in a tenant.
+func hasPermission(ctx context.Context, q querier, actorID, tenantID string, permission role.Permission) (bool, error) {
+	var permitted bool
+	err := q.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		`SELECT `+permissionPredicate("$2", "$1", "$3"),
+		actorID, tenantID, string(permission)).Scan(&permitted)
+	return permitted, err
+}
+
+// within reports whether every permission in granted also appears in held.
+func within(granted, held []string) bool {
+	available := make(map[string]bool, len(held))
+	for _, permission := range held {
+		available[permission] = true
+	}
+	for _, permission := range granted {
+		if !available[permission] {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// normalizePermissions validates submitted permission names and returns them
+// deduplicated in vocabulary order, so a role cannot be stored with an invented
+// capability or an unstable order.
+func normalizePermissions(permissions []string) ([]string, error) {
+	requested := make(map[string]bool, len(permissions))
+	for _, value := range permissions {
+		parsed, ok := role.Parse(value)
+		if !ok {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrUnknownPermission, value)
+		}
+		requested[string(parsed)] = true
+	}
+	result := make([]string, 0, len(requested))
+	for _, permission := range role.Permissions() {
+		if requested[string(permission)] {
+			result = append(result, string(permission))
+		}
+	}
+	return result, nil
+}
+
+// roleGrants reads a role's permissions.
+func roleGrants(ctx context.Context, q querier, roleID string) ([]string, error) {
+	rows, err := q.QueryContext(ctx, `
+		SELECT permission FROM role_permissions WHERE role_id = $1 ORDER BY permission`, roleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	result := make([]string, 0)
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var permission string
+		if err := rows.Scan(&permission); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		result = append(result, permission)
+	}
+	return result, rows.Err()
+}
+
+func scanRole(row scanner) (Role, error) {
+	var item Role
+	var tenantID sql.NullString
+	if err := row.Scan(&item.ID, &tenantID, &item.Slug, &item.Name, &item.Description,
+		&item.System, &item.MemberCount); err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	if tenantID.Valid {
+		item.TenantID = &tenantID.String
+	}
+	return item, nil
+}
+
+const roleSelect = `
+	SELECT r.id, r.tenant_id, r.slug, r.name, r.description, r.is_system,
+	       (SELECT count(*) FROM memberships m WHERE m.role_id = r.id)
+	FROM roles r `
+
+// ListRoles returns the roles available in a tenant: every built-in role plus
+// that tenant's own. Reading the catalog needs users.read so the role screen can
+// describe a role before anybody is assigned it.
+func (s *Store) ListRoles(ctx context.Context, actorID, tenantID string) ([]Role, error) {
+	permitted, err := hasPermission(ctx, s.db, actorID, tenantID, role.ReadUsers)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if !permitted {
+		return nil, ErrNotFound
+	}
+	roles, err := s.rolesIn(ctx, s.db, actorID, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return roles, nil
+}
+
+// AssignableRoles returns only the roles the administrator may hand to a member.
+func (s *Store) AssignableRoles(ctx context.Context, actorID, tenantID string) ([]Role, error) {
+	roles, err := s.ListRoles(ctx, actorID, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	result := make([]Role, 0, len(roles))
+	for _, item := range roles {
+		if item.Assignable {
+			result = append(result, item)
+		}
+	}
+	return result, nil
+}
+
+// rolesIn loads the tenant's catalog and marks what the actor may assign.
+func (s *Store) rolesIn(ctx context.Context, q querier, actorID, tenantID string) ([]Role, error) {
+	rows, err := q.QueryContext(ctx, roleSelect+`
+		WHERE r.tenant_id IS NULL OR r.tenant_id = $1
+		ORDER BY r.is_system DESC,
+		         array_position(ARRAY['owner','admin','developer','operator','viewer','user'], r.slug) NULLS LAST,
+		         r.name`, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	held, err := heldPermissions(ctx, q, actorID, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	result := make([]Role, 0)
+	for rows.Next() {
+		item, err := scanRole(rows)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		permissions, err := roleGrants(ctx, q, item.ID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		item.Permissions = permissions
+		item.Assignable = within(permissions, held)
+		result = append(result, item)
+	}
+	return result, rows.Err()
+}
+
+func roleByID(ctx context.Context, q querier, roleID string) (Role, error) {
+	item, err := scanRole(q.QueryRowContext(ctx, roleSelect+`WHERE r.id = $1`, roleID))
+	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+		return Role{}, ErrNotFound
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	return item, nil
+}
+
+// CreateRole adds a tenant's own role. The caller must hold roles.manage and may
+// not mint a role more powerful than one they already hold.
+func (s *Store) CreateRole(ctx context.Context, actorID, tenantID, slug, name, description string, permissions []string) (Role, error) {
+	granted, err := normalizePermissions(permissions)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	tx, err := s.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	defer tx.Rollback()
+
+	held, err := heldPermissions(ctx, tx, actorID, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	if !within([]string{string(role.ManageRoles)}, held) || !within(granted, held) {
+		return Role{}, ErrNotFound
+	}
+	created, err := insertRole(ctx, tx, tenantID, slug, name, description)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	for _, permission := range granted {
+		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
+			INSERT INTO role_permissions(role_id, permission) VALUES ($1, $2)`,
+			created.ID, permission); err != nil {
+			return Role{}, err
+		}
+	}
+	created.Permissions = granted
+	created.Assignable = true
+	return created, tx.Commit()
+}
+
+// UpdateRole renames a role and replaces its permissions. Built-in roles are
+// immutable and a tenant may only edit a role it owns.
+func (s *Store) UpdateRole(ctx context.Context, actorID, roleID, name, description string, permissions []string) (Role, error) {
+	granted, err := normalizePermissions(permissions)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	tx, err := s.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	defer tx.Rollback()
+
+	existing, err := lockRole(ctx, tx, roleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	if existing.System || existing.TenantID == nil {
+		return Role{}, ErrNotFound
+	}
+	held, err := heldPermissions(ctx, tx, actorID, *existing.TenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	if !within([]string{string(role.ManageRoles)}, held) || !within(granted, held) {
+		return Role{}, ErrNotFound
+	}
+	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
+		UPDATE roles SET name = $2, description = $3, updated_at = now() WHERE id = $1`,
+		roleID, name, description); err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM role_permissions WHERE role_id = $1`, roleID); err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	for _, permission := range granted {
+		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
+			INSERT INTO role_permissions(role_id, permission) VALUES ($1, $2)`,
+			roleID, permission); err != nil {
+			return Role{}, err
+		}
+	}
+	existing.Name, existing.Description, existing.Permissions = name, description, granted
+	return existing, tx.Commit()
+}
+
+// DeleteRole removes a tenant's own role. Built-in roles and roles that still
+// have members cannot be deleted, so nobody is left pointing at nothing.
+func (s *Store) DeleteRole(ctx context.Context, actorID, roleID string) error {
+	tx, err := s.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer tx.Rollback()
+
+	existing, err := lockRole(ctx, tx, roleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if existing.System || existing.TenantID == nil {
+		return ErrNotFound
+	}
+	permissions, err := roleGrants(ctx, tx, roleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	held, err := heldPermissions(ctx, tx, actorID, *existing.TenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !within([]string{string(role.ManageRoles)}, held) || !within(permissions, held) {
+		return ErrNotFound
+	}
+	if existing.MemberCount > 0 {
+		return ErrRoleInUse
+	}
+	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM roles WHERE id = $1`, roleID); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return tx.Commit()
+}
+
+// resolveRoleID validates that a role may be assigned to a member of the tenant
+// and returns its id. A role belonging to another tenant is reported as not
+// found so that role ids cannot be probed across tenants.
+func resolveRoleID(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, tenantID, roleID string, held []string) (string, error) {
+	item, err := roleByID(ctx, tx, roleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if item.TenantID != nil && *item.TenantID != tenantID {
+		return "", ErrNotFound
+	}
+	granted, err := roleGrants(ctx, tx, roleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if !within(granted, held) {
+		return "", ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return roleID, nil
+}
+
+// lockRole loads a role and holds the row for the rest of the transaction.
+func lockRole(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, roleID string) (Role, error) {
+	item, err := scanRole(tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, roleSelect+`WHERE r.id = $1 FOR UPDATE`, roleID))
+	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+		return Role{}, ErrNotFound
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	permissions, err := roleGrants(ctx, tx, roleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	item.Permissions = permissions
+	return item, nil
+}
+
+// insertRole writes the role row, translating a slug collision into a stable
+// error rather than a driver-specific constraint violation.
+func insertRole(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, tenantID, slug, name, description string) (Role, error) {
+	item, err := scanRole(tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO roles(tenant_id, slug, name, description)
+		VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)
+		RETURNING id, tenant_id, slug, name, description, is_system, 0`,
+		tenantID, slug, name, description))
+	if err != nil {
+		if isUniqueViolation(err) {
+			return Role{}, ErrRoleSlugTaken
+		}
+		return Role{}, err
+	}
+	return item, nil
+}
+
+func isUniqueViolation(err error) bool {
+	return err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "duplicate key value")
+}
diff --git a/internal/store/roles_integration_test.go b/internal/store/roles_integration_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4fc7ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/store/roles_integration_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+package store_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/role"
+	"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/store"
+)
+
+// rolesFixture creates a tenant owned by owner plus a developer member. The
+// developer is the interesting actor: it administers members but does not hold
+// roles.manage, so it is the boundary the escalation guards are tested against.
+func rolesFixture(t *testing.T) (s *store.Store, ctx context.Context, owner, developer, tenantID string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	s, _, ctx = integrationStore(t)
+	owner = newUser(t, s, ctx, "owner@example.test")
+	tenantID = newTenant(t, s, ctx, owner, "nmbs").ID
+	developer = addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenantID, "developer@example.test", "developer")
+	return s, ctx, owner, developer, tenantID
+}
+
+func systemRole(t *testing.T, s *store.Store, ctx context.Context, slug string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	id, err := s.SystemRoleID(ctx, slug)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("look up built-in role %q: %v", slug, err)
+	}
+	return id
+}
+
+func TestTenantCanDefineItsOwnRoleAndItIsEnforced(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ctx, owner, _, tenantID := rolesFixture(t)
+	application, err := s.CreateApplication(ctx, owner, store.Application{
+		TenantID: tenantID, Slug: "guess", Name: "Guess", AllowedHosts: []string{},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create application: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	created, err := s.CreateRole(ctx, owner, tenantID, "release-manager",
+		"Release manager", "Prepares releases.",
+		[]string{string(role.ReadConsole), string(role.ManageContracts), string(role.ReadUsers)})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create role: %v", err)
+	}
+	if created.System {
+		t.Error("a tenant role must not be marked as built in")
+	}
+	if created.TenantID == nil || *created.TenantID != tenantID {
+		t.Errorf("tenant id = %v, want %s", created.TenantID, tenantID)
+	}
+	if !contains(created.Permissions, string(role.ManageContracts)) {
+		t.Errorf("permissions = %v, want contracts.manage", created.Permissions)
+	}
+
+	// The role grants exactly what it says and nothing more.
+	member := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenantID, "member@example.test", "viewer")
+	if err := s.SetUserAccess(ctx, owner, tenantID, member, created.ID, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("assign the custom role: %v", err)
+	}
+	_, err = s.CreateAPIKey(ctx, member, application.ID, "key", "gl_prefix", secretHash("custom-denied"), nil)
+	assertPermission(t, "custom role issuing a key", err, false)
+	_, err = s.SaveContract(ctx, member, application.ID, contractDocument(), nil)
+	assertPermission(t, "custom role importing a contract", err, true)
+}
+
+func TestCustomRoleIsScopedToItsOwnTenant(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ctx, owner, _, tenantID := rolesFixture(t)
+	other := newUser(t, s, ctx, "other-owner@example.test")
+	otherTenant := newTenant(t, s, ctx, other, "ypto").ID
+
+	created, err := s.CreateRole(ctx, owner, tenantID, "auditor", "Auditor", "", []string{string(role.ReadConsole)})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create role: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	roles, err := s.ListRoles(ctx, other, otherTenant)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("list roles: %v", err)
+	}
+	for _, item := range roles {
+		if item.ID == created.ID {
+			t.Fatal("a role leaked across tenants")
+		}
+	}
+	if err := s.DeleteRole(ctx, other, created.ID); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("cross-tenant delete = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.UpdateRole(ctx, other, created.ID, "Hijacked", "", nil); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("cross-tenant update = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuiltInRolesCannotBeEditedOrDeleted(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ctx, owner, _, _ := rolesFixture(t)
+	ownerRole := systemRole(t, s, ctx, "owner")
+	if _, err := s.UpdateRole(ctx, owner, ownerRole, "Supreme", "", nil); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("editing a built-in role = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.DeleteRole(ctx, owner, ownerRole); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("deleting a built-in role = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRoleInUseCannotBeDeleted(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ctx, owner, _, tenantID := rolesFixture(t)
+	created, err := s.CreateRole(ctx, owner, tenantID, "support", "Support", "", []string{string(role.ReadConsole)})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create role: %v", err)
+	}
+	member := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenantID, "member@example.test", "viewer")
+	if err := s.SetUserAccess(ctx, owner, tenantID, member, created.ID, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("assign role: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.DeleteRole(ctx, owner, created.ID); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrRoleInUse) {
+		t.Fatalf("delete an assigned role = %v, want ErrRoleInUse", err)
+	}
+	// Once nobody holds it the delete goes through.
+	if err := s.SetUserAccess(ctx, owner, tenantID, member, systemRole(t, s, ctx, "viewer"), nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("move the member off the role: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.DeleteRole(ctx, owner, created.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("delete an unused role: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRoleAssignmentCannotEscalate is the guard that matters most now that
+// developer and operator may manage members: they must not be able to hand
+// somebody a role more powerful than their own, which would otherwise be a
+// straightforward route to owner.
+func TestRoleAssignmentCannotEscalate(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ctx, owner, developer, tenantID := rolesFixture(t)
+	victim := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenantID, "victim@example.test", "viewer")
+	ownerRole := systemRole(t, s, ctx, "owner")
+
+	if err := s.SetUserAccess(ctx, developer, tenantID, victim, ownerRole, nil); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("developer promoting a member to owner = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.InviteUser(ctx, developer, tenantID, "sneaky@example.test", "Sneaky", ownerRole, "hash"); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("developer inviting as owner = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.CreateRole(ctx, developer, tenantID, "shadow-owner", "Shadow", "",
+		[]string{string(role.ReadConsole), string(role.ManageTenants)}); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("developer creating an owner-grade role = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+	// Nor may they define any role at all: roles.manage is not theirs to hold,
+	// however weak the role they were trying to mint.
+	if _, err := s.CreateRole(ctx, developer, tenantID, "teammate", "Teammate", "",
+		[]string{string(role.ReadConsole), string(role.ReadUsers)}); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("developer creating any role = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+	// The developer can still maintain members using the roles already offered.
+	if _, err := s.InviteUser(ctx, developer, tenantID, "teammate@example.test", "Teammate",
+		systemRole(t, s, ctx, "viewer"), "hash"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("developer inviting a member: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRolesManageIsRequiredToDefineRoles(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ctx, _, developer, tenantID := rolesFixture(t)
+	if _, err := s.ListRoles(ctx, developer, tenantID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("a developer may read the role catalog: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.CreateRole(ctx, developer, tenantID, "nope", "Nope", "",
+		[]string{string(role.ReadConsole)}); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("developer creating a role = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAssignableRolesExcludeAnythingAboveTheActor(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ctx, _, developer, tenantID := rolesFixture(t)
+	assignable, err := s.AssignableRoles(ctx, developer, tenantID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("assignable roles: %v", err)
+	}
+	ownerRole := systemRole(t, s, ctx, "owner")
+	found := 0
+	for _, item := range assignable {
+		if !item.Assignable {
+			t.Errorf("role %q was returned but is not marked assignable", item.Slug)
+		}
+		if contains(item.Permissions, string(role.ManageTenants)) {
+			t.Errorf("developer may assign %q, which grants tenants.manage", item.Slug)
+		}
+		if item.ID == ownerRole {
+			t.Error("a developer must not be offered the owner role")
+		}
+		found++
+	}
+	if found == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("a developer should still be offered the roles within their authority")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUnknownPermissionIsRejectedWhenDefiningARole(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ctx, owner, _, tenantID := rolesFixture(t)
+	_, err := s.CreateRole(ctx, owner, tenantID, "sneaky", "Sneaky", "",
+		[]string{string(role.ReadConsole), "superpower"})
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a role must not be creatable with an unknown permission")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDuplicateRoleSlugIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ctx, owner, _, tenantID := rolesFixture(t)
+	if _, err := s.CreateRole(ctx, owner, tenantID, "auditor", "Auditor", "",
+		[]string{string(role.ReadConsole)}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create role: %v", err)
+	}
+	_, err := s.CreateRole(ctx, owner, tenantID, "auditor", "Another", "",
+		[]string{string(role.ReadConsole)})
+	if !errors.Is(err, store.ErrRoleSlugTaken) {
+		t.Fatalf("duplicate slug = %v, want ErrRoleSlugTaken", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestTenantKeepsAnOwner guards the demotion path: the last owner of a tenant
+// must not be able to walk away from it and lock every administrator out.
+func TestTenantKeepsAnOwner(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ctx, owner, _, tenantID := rolesFixture(t)
+	admin := addMember(t, s, ctx, owner, tenantID, "admin@example.test", "admin")
+	adminRole := systemRole(t, s, ctx, "admin")
+	ownerRole := systemRole(t, s, ctx, "owner")
+
+	// The owner cannot simply step down while nobody else holds the role.
+	if err := s.SetUserAccess(ctx, owner, tenantID, owner, adminRole, nil); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrLastOwner) {
+		t.Fatalf("owner stepping down alone = %v, want ErrLastOwner", err)
+	}
+	// Handing the role over first makes the step down legal.
+	if err := s.SetUserAccess(ctx, owner, tenantID, admin, ownerRole, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("promote the admin to owner: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.SetUserAccess(ctx, admin, tenantID, owner, adminRole, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("step down once a second owner exists: %v", err)
+	}
+	// The admin is now the only owner and must not be able to walk away from it.
+	if err := s.SetUserAccess(ctx, admin, tenantID, admin, adminRole, nil); !errors.Is(err, store.ErrLastOwner) {
+		t.Fatalf("demoting the last owner = %v, want ErrLastOwner", err)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/store/store.go b/internal/store/store.go
index 24f7f80..dd55116 100644
--- a/internal/store/store.go
+++ b/internal/store/store.go
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ type Tenant struct {
 	Slug string `json:"slug"`
 	Name string `json:"name"`
 	Role string `json:"role"`
-	// Permissions is derived from Role so that the console and API clients read
-	// capabilities instead of re-implementing the role matrix.
+	// Permissions is read from the role's own rows rather than from a Go matrix,
+	// so a tenant that defines its own roles is described accurately.
 	Permissions []string `json:"permissions"`
 }
 
@@ -130,11 +130,13 @@ func (s *Store) Bootstrap(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantSlug, appSlug strin
 		return err
 	}
 	if _, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
-		INSERT INTO memberships(tenant_id, user_id, role)
-		SELECT $1, $2, $3
-		WHERE NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM memberships WHERE tenant_id = $1)
-		   OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM memberships WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND user_id = $2)
-		ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`, tenantID, userID, role.Owner); err != nil {
+		INSERT INTO memberships(tenant_id, user_id, role_id)
+		SELECT $1, $2, r.id
+		FROM roles r
+		WHERE r.slug = $3 AND r.tenant_id IS NULL
+		  AND (NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM memberships WHERE tenant_id = $1)
+		       OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM memberships WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND user_id = $2))
+		ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`, tenantID, userID, "owner"); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 	if _, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
@@ -157,9 +159,15 @@ func (s *Store) Bootstrap(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantSlug, appSlug strin
 
 func (s *Store) ListTenants(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]Tenant, error) {
 	rows, err := s.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
-		SELECT t.id, t.slug, t.name, m.role
+		SELECT t.id, t.slug, t.name, r.slug,
+		       COALESCE((
+		           SELECT json_agg(rp.permission ORDER BY rp.permission)
+		           FROM role_permissions rp
+		           WHERE rp.role_id = m.role_id
+		       ), '[]'::json)
 		FROM tenants t
 		JOIN memberships m ON m.tenant_id = t.id
+		JOIN roles r ON r.id = m.role_id
 		WHERE m.user_id = $1
 		ORDER BY t.name`, userID)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -169,10 +177,13 @@ func (s *Store) ListTenants(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]Tenant, error
 	result := make([]Tenant, 0)
 	for rows.Next() {
 		var item Tenant
-		if err := rows.Scan(&item.ID, &item.Slug, &item.Name, &item.Role); err != nil {
+		var permissions []byte
+		if err := rows.Scan(&item.ID, &item.Slug, &item.Name, &item.Role, &permissions); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(permissions, &item.Permissions); err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
-		item.Permissions = role.Role(item.Role).Permissions()
 		result = append(result, item)
 	}
 	return result, rows.Err()
@@ -190,11 +201,26 @@ func (s *Store) CreateTenant(ctx context.Context, userID, slug, name string) (Te
 	if err != nil {
 		return Tenant{}, err
 	}
-	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO memberships(tenant_id, user_id, role) VALUES ($1, $2, 'owner')`, tenant.ID, userID); err != nil {
+	// Whoever creates a tenant owns it.
+	var permissions []byte
+	err = tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO memberships(tenant_id, user_id, role_id)
+		SELECT $1, $2, r.id FROM roles r
+		WHERE r.slug = 'owner' AND r.tenant_id IS NULL
+		RETURNING (SELECT slug FROM roles WHERE slug = 'owner' AND tenant_id IS NULL),
+		          COALESCE((
+		              SELECT json_agg(rp.permission ORDER BY rp.permission)
+		              FROM role_permissions rp
+		              JOIN roles granted ON granted.id = rp.role_id
+		              WHERE granted.slug = 'owner' AND granted.tenant_id IS NULL
+		          ), '[]'::json)`,
+		tenant.ID, userID).Scan(&tenant.Role, &permissions)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Tenant{}, err
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(permissions, &tenant.Permissions); err != nil {
 		return Tenant{}, err
 	}
-	tenant.Role = string(role.Owner)
-	tenant.Permissions = role.Owner.Permissions()
 	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
 		return Tenant{}, err
 	}
@@ -237,14 +263,11 @@ func (s *Store) CreateApplication(ctx context.Context, userID string, app Applic
 	row := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
 		INSERT INTO applications(tenant_id, slug, name, description, allowed_hosts)
 		SELECT $1, $2, $3, $4, $5
-		WHERE EXISTS (
-			SELECT 1 FROM memberships
-			WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND user_id = $6 AND role = ANY($7)
-		)
+		WHERE `+permissionPredicate("$1", "$6", "$7")+`
 		RETURNING id, tenant_id, slug, name, description, to_json(allowed_hosts),
 		          client_id, to_json(redirect_uris), false`,
 		app.TenantID, app.Slug, app.Name, app.Description, app.AllowedHosts, userID,
-		role.Grants(role.ManageApplications))
+		string(role.ManageApplications))
 	var allowedHosts, redirectURIs []byte
 	err := row.Scan(&app.ID, &app.TenantID, &app.Slug, &app.Name, &app.Description, &allowedHosts, &app.ClientID, &redirectURIs, &app.ClientReady)
 	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
@@ -287,10 +310,9 @@ func (s *Store) CreateAPIKey(ctx context.Context, userID, applicationID, name, p
 		INSERT INTO api_keys(tenant_id, application_id, name, prefix, secret_hash, expires_at, created_by)
 		SELECT a.tenant_id, a.id, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6
 		FROM applications a
-		JOIN memberships m ON m.tenant_id = a.tenant_id
-		WHERE a.id = $1 AND m.user_id = $6 AND m.role = ANY($7)
+		WHERE a.id = $1 AND `+permissionPredicate("a.tenant_id", "$6", "$7")+`
 		RETURNING id, application_id, name, prefix, status, expires_at, last_used_at, created_at`,
-		applicationID, name, prefix, hash, expiresAt, userID, role.Grants(role.ManageKeys)).
+		applicationID, name, prefix, hash, expiresAt, userID, string(role.ManageKeys)).
 		Scan(&item.ID, &item.ApplicationID, &item.Name, &item.Prefix, &item.Status, &item.ExpiresAt, &item.LastUsedAt, &item.CreatedAt)
 	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
 		return APIKey{}, ErrNotFound
@@ -301,9 +323,8 @@ func (s *Store) CreateAPIKey(ctx context.Context, userID, applicationID, name, p
 func (s *Store) RevokeAPIKey(ctx context.Context, userID, keyID string) error {
 	result, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
 		UPDATE api_keys k SET status = 'revoked', revoked_at = now()
-		FROM memberships m
-		WHERE k.id = $1 AND m.tenant_id = k.tenant_id AND m.user_id = $2 AND m.role = ANY($3)`,
-		keyID, userID, role.Grants(role.ManageKeys))
+		WHERE k.id = $1 AND `+permissionPredicate("k.tenant_id", "$2", "$3"),
+		keyID, userID, string(role.ManageKeys))
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -363,11 +384,10 @@ func (s *Store) SaveContract(ctx context.Context, userID, applicationID string,
 		INSERT INTO openapi_contracts(application_id, version, source_url, document, created_by)
 		SELECT a.id, $2, $3, $4, $5
 		FROM applications a
-		JOIN memberships m ON m.tenant_id = a.tenant_id
-		WHERE a.id = $1 AND m.user_id = $5 AND m.role = ANY($6)
+		WHERE a.id = $1 AND `+permissionPredicate("a.tenant_id", "$5", "$6")+`
 		RETURNING id, application_id, version, source_url, created_at`,
 		applicationID, document.Version, sourceURL, document.JSON, userID,
-		role.Grants(role.ManageContracts)).
+		string(role.ManageContracts)).
 		Scan(&result.ID, &result.ApplicationID, &result.Version, &result.SourceURL, &result.CreatedAt)
 	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
 		return Contract{}, ErrNotFound
diff --git a/web/app.js b/web/app.js
index 6f5535a..462ba3e 100644
--- a/web/app.js
+++ b/web/app.js
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
 const state = {
     tenants: [], applications: [], keys: [], contracts: [], users: [], pending_users: [],
-    roles: [], profile: null, selectedTenant: ''
+    roles: [], permissions: [], profile: null, selectedTenant: ''
 };
 // Capability names mirror internal/role. The server sends the grants for the
 // selected tenant so the console never re-implements the matrix.
 const grants = (tenant, permission) => Boolean(tenant?.permissions?.includes(permission));
 const $ = selector => document.querySelector(selector);
 
-const roleOptions = roles => roles
-    .map(item => `<option value="${escapeHTML(item.value)}">${escapeHTML(item.label)}</option>`)
-    .join('');
 const $$ = selector => [...document.querySelectorAll(selector)];
 const escapeHTML = value => String(value ?? '').replace(/[&<>"']/g, c => ({
     '&': '&amp;',
@@ -48,11 +45,28 @@ async function load() {
     const data = await api('/api/v1/dashboard');
     Object.assign(state, data);
     if (!state.tenants.some(tenant => tenant.id === state.selectedTenant)) state.selectedTenant = state.tenants[0]?.id || '';
+    await loadRoles();
     renderIdentity();
-    renderRoleOptions();
     render();
 }
 
+// loadRoles fetches the role catalog for the selected tenant. Roles are rows now
+// rather than a fixed list, so they have to be asked for per tenant, and the
+// server marks which ones the signed-in user is allowed to hand out.
+async function loadRoles() {
+    if (!state.selectedTenant) {
+        state.roles = [];
+        return
+    }
+    try {
+        state.roles = (await api(`/api/v1/roles?tenant_id=${encodeURIComponent(state.selectedTenant)}`)).roles
+    } catch (error) {
+        // A user who cannot read the role catalog still gets the rest of the
+        // console; the invite and access dialogs simply offer nothing.
+        state.roles = [];
+    }
+}
+
 function renderIdentity() {
     const profile = state.profile || {};
     $('#identity-name').textContent = profile.display_name || profile.email || '';
@@ -66,11 +80,15 @@ function renderIdentity() {
     }
 }
 
-function renderRoleOptions() {
-    // Inviting an owner is rejected by the server, so leave it out of the list.
-    const invitable = state.roles.filter(item => item.value !== 'owner');
-    $('#invite-role').innerHTML = roleOptions(invitable);
-    $('#access-role').innerHTML = roleOptions(state.roles);
+// assignableRoles is what the invite and access dialogs may offer: the server
+// refuses to hand out a role more powerful than the caller's own, so offering
+// anything else would only produce an error.
+function assignableRoles() {
+    return state.roles.filter(item => item.assignable)
+}
+
+function roleLabel(roleID) {
+    return state.roles.find(item => item.id === roleID)?.name || roleID
 }
 
 function render() {
@@ -98,7 +116,8 @@ function render() {
     $('#key-list').innerHTML = tenantKeys.map(item => `<tr><td>${escapeHTML(item.name)}</td><td>${escapeHTML(apps.get(item.application_id)?.name || '—')}</td><td><code>${escapeHTML(item.prefix)}…</code></td><td><span class="badge">${escapeHTML(item.status)}</span></td><td>${date(item.last_used_at)}</td><td>${canManageKeys && item.status === 'active' ? `<button class="danger" data-revoke="${escapeHTML(item.id)}">Revoke</button>` : ''}</td></tr>`).join('') || rowEmpty(6, 'No keys issued');
     $('#contract-list').innerHTML = tenantContracts.map(item => `<tr><td>${escapeHTML(apps.get(item.application_id)?.name || '—')}</td><td>${escapeHTML(item.version)}</td><td>${item.endpoint_count}</td><td>${item.source_url ? `<a href="${escapeHTML(item.source_url)}" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">source</a>` : 'Pasted'}</td><td>${date(item.created_at)}</td></tr>`).join('') || rowEmpty(5, 'No contracts imported');
     const pending = state.is_system_administrator ? state.pending_users.map(item => `<tr><td><strong>${escapeHTML(item.display_name)}</strong><br><small>${escapeHTML(item.email)}</small></td><td>Waiting room</td><td>—</td><td><span class="badge">pending</span></td><td>0</td><td><button class="card-action" data-pending="${escapeHTML(item.id)}">Approve</button></td></tr>`).join('') : '';
-    $('#user-list').innerHTML = tenantUsers.map(item => `<tr><td>${avatarCell(item)}<strong>${escapeHTML(item.display_name)}</strong><br><small>${escapeHTML(item.email)}</small></td><td>${escapeHTML(state.tenants.find(t => t.id === item.tenant_id)?.name || '—')}</td><td><span class="badge">${escapeHTML(item.role)}</span></td><td>${escapeHTML(item.status)}</td><td>${item.application_ids.length}</td><td>${canManageUsers ? `<button class="card-action" data-access="${escapeHTML(item.id)}" data-tenant="${escapeHTML(item.tenant_id)}">Manage</button>` : ''}</td></tr>`).join('') + pending || rowEmpty(6, 'No users');
+    $('#user-list').innerHTML = tenantUsers.map(item => `<tr><td>${avatarCell(item)}<strong>${escapeHTML(item.display_name)}</strong><br><small>${escapeHTML(item.email)}</small></td><td>${escapeHTML(state.tenants.find(t => t.id === item.tenant_id)?.name || '—')}</td><td><span class="badge">${escapeHTML(roleLabel(item.role_id) || item.role)}</span></td><td>${escapeHTML(item.status)}</td><td>${item.application_ids.length}</td><td>${canManageUsers ? `<button class="card-action" data-access="${escapeHTML(item.id)}" data-tenant="${escapeHTML(item.tenant_id)}">Manage</button>` : ''}</td></tr>`).join('') + pending || rowEmpty(6, 'No users');
+    renderRoleOptions();
     $$('[data-tenant-application-action]').forEach(element => element.hidden = !canManageApplications);
     $$('[data-tenant-key-action]').forEach(element => element.hidden = !canManageKeys);
     $$('[data-tenant-contract-action]').forEach(element => element.hidden = !canManageContracts);
@@ -110,6 +129,20 @@ function render() {
     $$('.app-select').forEach(select => select.innerHTML = tenantApps.map(item => `<option value="${escapeHTML(item.id)}">${escapeHTML(item.name)}</option>`).join(''));
 }
 
+// renderRoleOptions fills both role pickers. The current value is preserved so
+// that re-rendering the table does not silently reset a pending edit.
+function renderRoleOptions() {
+    const options = assignableRoles();
+    const html = options.map(item => `<option value="${escapeHTML(item.id)}">${escapeHTML(item.name)}</option>`).join('');
+    for (const id of ['#invite-role', '#access-role']) {
+        const select = $(id);
+        if (!select) continue;
+        const current = select.value;
+        select.innerHTML = html;
+        if (current && options.some(item => item.id === current)) select.value = current
+    }
+}
+
 const empty = text => `<article class="card"><p>${text}</p></article>`;
 const initials = name => String(name || '?').split(/[\s@._-]+/).filter(Boolean).slice(0, 2).map(part => part[0].toUpperCase()).join('') || '?';
 const avatarCell = item => item.avatar_url
@@ -230,7 +263,10 @@ document.addEventListener('click', async event => {
         form.tenant_id.value = user.tenant_id;
         form.approval_mode.value = 'false';
         $('#approval-tenant-label').hidden = true;
-        form.role.value = user.role;
+        // A role the caller may not hand out is not in the picker, so fall back
+        // to the first one they can assign rather than submitting the old value.
+        const current = assignableRoles().some(item => item.id === user.role_id);
+        form.role_id.value = current ? user.role_id : assignableRoles()[0]?.id || '';
         renderAccessApps(user.tenant_id, user.application_ids);
         $('#access-dialog').showModal();
         return
@@ -242,7 +278,7 @@ document.addEventListener('click', async event => {
         form.approval_mode.value = 'true';
         $('#approval-tenant-label').hidden = false;
         form.approval_tenant_id.value = state.selectedTenant;
-        form.role.value = 'viewer';
+        form.role_id.value = assignableRoles()[0]?.id || '';
         renderAccessApps(state.selectedTenant, []);
         $('#access-dialog').showModal()
     }
@@ -269,8 +305,9 @@ mode.addEventListener('click', () => {
     document.documentElement.dataset.mode = next;
     localStorage.setItem('gl-mode', next)
 });
-$('#tenant-context').addEventListener('change', event => {
+$('#tenant-context').addEventListener('change', async event => {
     state.selectedTenant = event.target.value;
+    await loadRoles();
     render()
 });
 $('#access-form').approval_tenant_id.addEventListener('change', event => renderAccessApps(event.target.value, []));
diff --git a/web/index.html b/web/index.html
index 8dc2a9b..6edc2ef 100644
--- a/web/index.html
+++ b/web/index.html
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
     <a class="brand" href="/"><span class="brand-mark">GL</span><span>Go Loose</span></a>
     <nav>
       <a href="/docs">API docs</a>
+      <a href="/roles">Roles</a>
       <label class="compact">Tenant<select id="tenant-context"></select></label>
       <label class="compact">Theme
         <select id="theme"><option value="tokyo">Tokyo Night</option><option value="catppuccin">Catppuccin</option><option value="tomorrow">Tomorrow</option><option value="kanagawa">Kanagawa</option></select>
@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@
         <section class="panel" id="users">
           <div class="panel-head"><div><p class="eyebrow">CLIENT IDENTITIES</p><h2>Users & access</h2></div><button data-dialog="user-dialog" data-tenant-user-action>Invite user</button></div>
           <div class="table-wrap"><table><thead><tr><th>User</th><th>Tenant</th><th>Role</th><th>Status</th><th>Applications</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody id="user-list"></tbody></table></div>
-          <p class="muted">Roles come from the shared permission matrix. <a href="/profile">Open your own profile</a> to change your name and picture.</p>
+          <p class="muted">Roles are per tenant and grant capabilities. <a href="/roles">Manage roles</a> to review or define your own. <a href="/profile">Open your own profile</a> to change your name and picture.</p>
         </section>
       </div>
     </section>
@@ -87,8 +88,8 @@
   <dialog id="key-dialog"><form id="key-form"><div class="dialog-head"><h3>Issue API key</h3><button type="button" class="close">×</button></div><label>Application<select name="application_id" class="app-select" required></select></label><label>Key name<input name="name" required placeholder="production-gateway"></label><label>Expires at <small>(optional)</small><input type="datetime-local" name="expires_at"></label><button type="submit">Issue key</button></form></dialog>
   <dialog id="contract-dialog"><form id="contract-form"><div class="dialog-head"><h3>Import OpenAPI contract</h3><button type="button" class="close">×</button></div><label>Application<select name="application_id" class="app-select" required></select></label><div class="segmented"><label><input type="radio" name="source_type" value="document" checked> Paste</label><label><input type="radio" name="source_type" value="url"> Scan URL</label></div><label>Source URL <small>(optional when pasting)</small><input type="url" name="source_url" placeholder="https://service/openapi.json"></label><label>OpenAPI JSON or YAML<textarea name="document" rows="12" placeholder="openapi: 3.1.0&#10;paths: ..."></textarea></label><button type="submit">Import contract</button></form></dialog>
   <dialog id="client-dialog"><form id="client-form"><div class="dialog-head"><h3>Configure client login</h3><button type="button" class="close">×</button></div><input type="hidden" name="application_id"><label>Client ID<input name="client_id" readonly></label><label>Redirect URIs <small>(one exact callback URL per line)</small><textarea name="redirect_uris" rows="5" placeholder="https://nmbs.guess.local/auth/callback" required></textarea></label><p class="muted">Saving rotates the client secret. Existing deployments must be updated immediately.</p><button type="submit">Save and rotate secret</button></form></dialog>
-  <dialog id="user-dialog"><form id="user-form"><div class="dialog-head"><h3>Invite tenant user</h3><button type="button" class="close">×</button></div><label>Tenant<select name="tenant_id" class="tenant-select" required></select></label><label>Email<input type="email" name="email" required></label><label>Display name<input name="display_name"></label><label>Initial password <small>(minimum 12 characters)</small><input type="password" name="password" minlength="12" autocomplete="new-password" required></label><label>Role<select name="role" id="invite-role" required></select></label><button type="submit">Invite user</button></form></dialog>
-  <dialog id="access-dialog"><form id="access-form"><div class="dialog-head"><h3>Manage user access</h3><button type="button" class="close">×</button></div><input type="hidden" name="user_id"><input type="hidden" name="tenant_id"><input type="hidden" name="approval_mode"><label id="approval-tenant-label" hidden>Tenant<select name="approval_tenant_id" class="tenant-select"></select></label><label>Role<select name="role" id="access-role" required></select></label><fieldset><legend>Applications</legend><div id="access-apps" class="check-list"></div></fieldset><button type="submit">Update access</button></form></dialog>
+  <dialog id="user-dialog"><form id="user-form"><div class="dialog-head"><h3>Invite tenant user</h3><button type="button" class="close">×</button></div><label>Tenant<select name="tenant_id" class="tenant-select" required></select></label><label>Email<input type="email" name="email" required></label><label>Display name<input name="display_name"></label><label>Initial password <small>(minimum 12 characters)</small><input type="password" name="password" minlength="12" autocomplete="new-password" required></label><label>Role<select name="role_id" id="invite-role" required></select></label><p class="muted">You can only assign roles that are no more powerful than your own.</p><button type="submit">Invite user</button></form></dialog>
+  <dialog id="access-dialog"><form id="access-form"><div class="dialog-head"><h3>Manage user access</h3><button type="button" class="close">×</button></div><input type="hidden" name="user_id"><input type="hidden" name="tenant_id"><input type="hidden" name="approval_mode"><label id="approval-tenant-label" hidden>Tenant<select name="approval_tenant_id" class="tenant-select"></select></label><label>Role<select name="role_id" id="access-role" required></select></label><fieldset><legend>Applications</legend><div id="access-apps" class="check-list"></div></fieldset><button type="submit">Update access</button></form></dialog>
   <dialog id="secret-dialog"><div class="dialog-head"><h3 id="secret-title">Secret issued</h3><button type="button" class="close">×</button></div><p id="secret-description">This secret is shown once. Copy it now.</p><div class="secret"><code id="new-secret"></code><button id="copy-secret" type="button">Copy</button></div></dialog>
 
   <script src="/assets/app.js" defer></script>
diff --git a/web/openapi.json b/web/openapi.json
index eec0dc9..2689a8f 100644
--- a/web/openapi.json
+++ b/web/openapi.json
@@ -46,8 +46,9 @@
           "tenant_id": {"type": "string", "format": "uuid"},
           "tenant_slug": {"type": "string"},
           "tenant_name": {"type": "string"},
-          "role": {"type": "string", "enum": ["owner", "admin", "developer", "operator", "viewer", "user"]},
-          "permissions": {"type": "array", "items": {"type": "string"}}
+          "role": {"type": "string", "description": "Slug of the role, which may be a role this tenant defined."},
+          "role_id": {"type": "string", "format": "uuid", "description": "Identifier of the role row. Send this back when assigning the role."},
+          "permissions": {"type": "array", "items": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/PermissionValue"}}
         }
       },
       "Profile": {
@@ -75,12 +76,45 @@
           "remove_avatar": {"type": "boolean"}
         }
       },
-      "RoleCatalogEntry": {
+      "Role": {
         "type": "object",
+        "description": "A named bundle of permissions. A built-in role has no tenant_id, is visible to every tenant, and cannot be edited or deleted. A tenant may define its own.",
+        "required": ["id", "slug", "name", "system", "permissions"],
         "properties": {
-          "value": {"type": "string"},
+          "id": {"type": "string", "format": "uuid"},
+          "tenant_id": {"type": "string", "format": "uuid", "description": "Absent for built-in roles."},
+          "slug": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$"},
+          "name": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 100},
+          "description": {"type": "string", "maxLength": 500},
+          "system": {"type": "boolean", "description": "True for built-in roles, which are read only."},
+          "permissions": {"type": "array", "items": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/PermissionValue"}},
+          "member_count": {"type": "integer", "description": "Members currently holding the role. A role that still has members cannot be deleted."},
+          "assignable": {"type": "boolean", "description": "Whether the caller may assign this role. False when the role grants a permission the caller does not hold, which is what stops role assignment becoming a way to gain authority."}
+        }
+      },
+      "PermissionValue": {
+        "type": "string",
+        "description": "The closed vocabulary of capabilities a role may grant. Mirrors internal/role and the role_permissions check constraint.",
+        "enum": ["tenants.manage", "roles.manage", "users.manage", "applications.manage", "keys.manage", "contracts.manage", "users.read", "console.read", "profile.edit"]
+      },
+      "PermissionEntry": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "description": "A permission with the label and description the console renders.",
+        "properties": {
+          "value": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/PermissionValue"},
           "label": {"type": "string"},
-          "permissions": {"type": "array", "items": {"type": "string"}}
+          "description": {"type": "string"}
+        }
+      },
+      "RoleRequest": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "required": ["name", "permissions"],
+        "properties": {
+          "tenant_id": {"type": "string", "format": "uuid", "description": "Required when creating. Ignored when updating, which takes the role's own tenant."},
+          "slug": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$", "description": "Required when creating, and fixed for the life of the role."},
+          "name": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 100},
+          "description": {"type": "string", "maxLength": 500},
+          "permissions": {"type": "array", "items": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/PermissionValue"}}
         }
       }
     }
@@ -300,7 +334,8 @@
         "tags": [
           "User Management"
         ],
-        "summary": "Invite a tenant user with an admin, developer, operator, viewer, or user role",
+        "summary": "Invite a tenant user with a role",
+        "description": "Requires users.manage in the tenant, which owner, admin, developer, and operator hold. role_id must name a role of that tenant whose permissions are a subset of the caller's own.",
         "security": [{"session": []}],
         "responses": {"201": {"description": "User invited"}}
       }
@@ -311,7 +346,7 @@
           "User Management"
         ],
         "summary": "Set tenant role and application access",
-        "description": "Any known role is accepted, including owner.",
+        "description": "Requires users.manage. The caller may not grant a role more powerful than their own, and may not demote the last owner of a tenant.",
         "security": [{"session": []}],
         "parameters": [{"in": "path", "name": "id", "required": true, "schema": {"type": "string", "format": "uuid"}}],
         "responses": {"204": {"description": "Access updated"}}
@@ -319,17 +354,53 @@
     },
     "/api/v1/roles": {
       "get": {
-        "tags": ["User Management"],
-        "summary": "List tenant roles with their capabilities",
+        "tags": ["Role Management"],
+        "summary": "List the roles available in a tenant",
+        "description": "Returns every built-in role plus the roles this tenant defined, each annotated with whether the caller may assign it.",
         "security": [{"session": []}],
-        "responses": {"200": {"description": "Role catalog", "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"type": "array", "items": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/RoleCatalogEntry"}}}}}}
+        "parameters": [{"in": "query", "name": "tenant_id", "required": true, "schema": {"type": "string", "format": "uuid"}}],
+        "responses": {"200": {"description": "Role catalog", "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"type": "object", "properties": {"roles": {"type": "array", "items": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/Role"}}}}}}}, "404": {"description": "Not a member of that tenant"}}
+      },
+      "post": {
+        "tags": ["Role Management"],
+        "summary": "Define a role for a tenant",
+        "description": "Requires roles.manage in the tenant. The role may not grant a permission the caller does not already hold, so an administrator cannot mint their way above their own authority.",
+        "security": [{"session": []}],
+        "requestBody": {"content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/RoleRequest"}}}},
+        "responses": {"201": {"description": "Role created", "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/Role"}}}}, "400": {"description": "Malformed slug or name, or an unknown permission"}, "404": {"description": "The caller does not hold roles.manage, or the role would exceed their authority"}, "409": {"description": "The slug is already used in this tenant"}}
+      }
+    },
+    "/api/v1/roles/{id}": {
+      "put": {
+        "tags": ["Role Management"],
+        "summary": "Rename a role and replace its permissions",
+        "description": "Built-in roles are immutable. Saving replaces the permissions of every member holding the role, so treat it as a live change.",
+        "security": [{"session": []}],
+        "parameters": [{"in": "path", "name": "id", "required": true, "schema": {"type": "string", "format": "uuid"}}],
+        "requestBody": {"content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/RoleRequest"}}}},
+        "responses": {"200": {"description": "Role updated", "content": {"application/json": {"schema": {"$ref": "#/components/schemas/Role"}}}}, "400": {"description": "Malformed name or an unknown permission"}, "404": {"description": "Unknown role, a built-in role, or a role belonging to another tenant"}}
+      },
+      "delete": {
+        "tags": ["Role Management"],
+        "summary": "Delete one of the tenant's own roles",
+        "security": [{"session": []}],
+        "parameters": [{"in": "path", "name": "id", "required": true, "schema": {"type": "string", "format": "uuid"}}],
+        "responses": {"204": {"description": "Role deleted"}, "404": {"description": "Unknown role, a built-in role, or a role belonging to another tenant"}, "409": {"description": "The role still has members"}}
+      }
+    },
+    "/roles": {
+      "get": {
+        "tags": ["Role Management"],
+        "summary": "Role management screen",
+        "security": [{"session": []}],
+        "responses": {"200": {"description": "HTML page"}}
       }
     },
     "/api/v1/users/{id}/approve": {
       "post": {
         "tags": ["User Management"],
         "summary": "Approve a waiting-room user into a tenant",
-        "description": "Requires a system administrator session.",
+        "description": "Requires a system administrator session. Unlike the tenant-scoped endpoints this is not limited by the caller's own role, because it grants a first membership across tenants.",
         "security": [{"session": []}],
         "parameters": [{"in": "path", "name": "id", "required": true, "schema": {"type": "string", "format": "uuid"}}],
         "responses": {"204": {"description": "User approved"}, "404": {"description": "User or permission not found"}}
diff --git a/web/profile.html b/web/profile.html
index 5e6ed2b..f8821cd 100644
--- a/web/profile.html
+++ b/web/profile.html
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
     <nav>
       <a href="/">Console</a>
       <a href="/docs">API docs</a>
+      <a href="/roles">Roles</a>
       <label class="compact">Theme
         <select id="theme"><option value="tokyo">Tokyo Night</option><option value="catppuccin">Catppuccin</option><option value="tomorrow">Tomorrow</option><option value="kanagawa">Kanagawa</option></select>
       </label>
diff --git a/web/roles.html b/web/roles.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ec70c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/web/roles.html
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html lang="en" data-theme="tokyo" data-mode="dark">
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
+  <meta name="color-scheme" content="dark light">
+  <title>Go Loose · Roles</title>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="/assets/style.css">
+</head>
+<body>
+  <div class="noise"></div>
+  <header>
+    <a class="brand" href="/"><span class="brand-mark">GL</span><span>Go Loose</span></a>
+    <nav>
+      <a href="/">Console</a>
+      <a href="/docs">API docs</a>
+      <label class="compact">Tenant<select id="tenant-context"></select></label>
+      <label class="compact">Theme
+        <select id="theme"><option value="tokyo">Tokyo Night</option><option value="catppuccin">Catppuccin</option><option value="tomorrow">Tomorrow</option><option value="kanagawa">Kanagawa</option></select>
+      </label>
+      <button id="mode" class="icon-button" title="Toggle light/dark mode">◐</button>
+      <a id="identity" class="identity" href="/profile"><img id="identity-avatar" alt="" width="22" height="22" hidden><span id="identity-name"></span></a>
+      <form action="/auth/logout" method="post"><button class="ghost" type="submit">Log out</button></form>
+    </nav>
+  </header>
+
+  <main>
+    <section class="hero">
+      <div>
+        <p class="eyebrow">ROLE MANAGEMENT</p>
+        <h1>Who may do<br><span>what, per tenant.</span></h1>
+        <p class="lede">A role is a named bundle of permissions. Built-in roles are shared by every tenant and cannot be edited; your own tenant can define as many more as it needs.</p>
+      </div>
+      <div class="status-card">
+        <div class="pulse"></div>
+        <div><strong id="role-summary">Roles</strong><span id="role-tenant">—</span></div>
+        <code id="role-count">—</code>
+      </div>
+    </section>
+
+    <div id="notice" class="notice" hidden></div>
+
+    <section class="stats" id="stats">
+      <article><span>Roles</span><strong id="stat-roles">—</strong></article>
+      <article><span>Built-in</span><strong id="stat-system">—</strong></article>
+      <article><span>Custom</span><strong id="stat-custom">—</strong></article>
+      <article><span>Assignable to you</span><strong id="stat-assignable">—</strong></article>
+    </section>
+
+    <section class="panel active" id="roles">
+      <div class="panel-head">
+        <div><p class="eyebrow">PERMISSION CATALOG</p><h2>Roles</h2></div>
+        <button id="new-role">New role</button>
+      </div>
+      <div class="table-wrap">
+        <table>
+          <thead><tr><th>Role</th><th>Slug</th><th>Permissions</th><th>Members</th><th>Assignable to you</th><th></th></tr></thead>
+          <tbody id="role-list"></tbody>
+        </table>
+      </div>
+      <p class="muted">You can only create and assign roles that grant no more than you already hold, so managing members can never be used to gain authority.</p>
+    </section>
+
+    <section class="panel active" id="permission-reference">
+      <div class="panel-head"><div><p class="eyebrow">VOCABULARY</p><h2>Permissions</h2></div></div>
+      <div class="table-wrap">
+        <table>
+          <thead><tr><th>Permission</th><th>What it allows</th></tr></thead>
+          <tbody id="permission-list"></tbody>
+        </table>
+      </div>
+    </section>
+  </main>
+
+  <dialog id="role-dialog">
+    <form id="role-form">
+      <div class="dialog-head"><h3 id="role-dialog-title">New role</h3><button type="button" class="close">×</button></div>
+      <input type="hidden" name="role_id">
+      <label id="role-slug-label">Slug<input name="slug" required pattern="[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}" placeholder="release-manager"></label>
+      <label>Name<input name="name" required maxlength="100" placeholder="Release manager"></label>
+      <label>Description <small>(optional)</small><textarea name="description" maxlength="500" placeholder="Prepares releases."></textarea></label>
+      <fieldset><legend>Permissions</legend><div id="role-permissions" class="check-list"></div></fieldset>
+      <p class="muted" id="role-hint"></p>
+      <button type="submit">Save role</button>
+    </form>
+  </dialog>
+
+  <script src="/assets/roles.js" defer></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/web/roles.js b/web/roles.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ecc40e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/web/roles.js
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+const state = {tenants: [], roles: [], permissions: [], selectedTenant: ''};
+const $ = selector => document.querySelector(selector);
+const $$ = selector => [...document.querySelectorAll(selector)];
+const escapeHTML = value => String(value ?? '').replace(/[&<>"']/g, c => ({
+    '&': '&amp;',
+    '<': '&lt;',
+    '>': '&gt;',
+    '"': '&quot;',
+    "'": '&#39;'
+}[c]));
+const notice = (message, error = false) => {
+    const el = $('#notice');
+    el.textContent = message;
+    el.hidden = false;
+    el.style.borderColor = error ? 'var(--danger)' : 'var(--accent)';
+    clearTimeout(notice.timer);
+    notice.timer = setTimeout(() => el.hidden = true, 5000)
+};
+
+async function api(path, options = {}) {
+    const response = await fetch(path, {
+        credentials: 'same-origin', ...options,
+        headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...(options.headers || {})}
+    });
+    if (response.status === 401) {
+        location.href = '/login';
+        throw new Error('Session expired')
+    }
+    const body = response.status === 204 ? null : await response.json();
+    if (!response.ok) throw new Error(body?.error || `Request failed (${response.status})`);
+    return body
+}
+
+async function load() {
+    const dashboard = await api('/api/v1/dashboard');
+    state.tenants = dashboard.tenants;
+    state.permissions = dashboard.permissions || [];
+    if (!state.tenants.some(tenant => tenant.id === state.selectedTenant)) state.selectedTenant = state.tenants[0]?.id || '';
+    renderIdentity(dashboard.profile);
+    await loadRoles();
+    render()
+}
+
+function renderIdentity(profile) {
+    profile = profile || {};
+    $('#identity-name').textContent = profile.display_name || profile.email || '';
+    const image = $('#identity-avatar');
+    if (profile.avatar_url) {
+        image.src = profile.avatar_url;
+        image.hidden = false
+    } else {
+        image.hidden = true;
+        image.removeAttribute('src')
+    }
+}
+
+async function loadRoles() {
+    if (!state.selectedTenant) {
+        state.roles = [];
+        return
+    }
+    try {
+        state.roles = (await api(`/api/v1/roles?tenant_id=${encodeURIComponent(state.selectedTenant)}`)).roles
+    } catch (error) {
+        state.roles = [];
+        notice('You do not have permission to read the roles of this tenant.', true)
+    }
+}
+
+function selectedTenant() {
+    return state.tenants.find(tenant => tenant.id === state.selectedTenant)
+}
+
+const canManageRoles = () => Boolean(selectedTenant()?.permissions?.includes('roles.manage'));
+
+function render() {
+    const tenant = selectedTenant();
+    const custom = state.roles.filter(item => !item.system);
+    $('#tenant-context').innerHTML = state.tenants.map(item =>
+        `<option value="${escapeHTML(item.id)}" ${item.id === state.selectedTenant ? 'selected' : ''}>${escapeHTML(item.name)}</option>`).join('');
+    $('#role-tenant').textContent = tenant ? tenant.name : 'No tenant';
+    $('#role-count').textContent = String(state.roles.length);
+    $('#role-summary').textContent = canManageRoles() ? 'Roles · editable' : 'Roles · read only';
+    $('#stat-roles').textContent = state.roles.length;
+    $('#stat-system').textContent = state.roles.length - custom.length;
+    $('#stat-custom').textContent = custom.length;
+    $('#stat-assignable').textContent = state.roles.filter(item => item.assignable).length;
+    $('#new-role').hidden = !canManageRoles();
+
+    $('#role-list').innerHTML = state.roles.map(item => `<tr>
+        <td><strong>${escapeHTML(item.name)}</strong>${item.system ? ' <span class="badge">built-in</span>' : ''}<br><small>${escapeHTML(item.description || 'No description')}</small></td>
+        <td><code>${escapeHTML(item.slug)}</code></td>
+        <td class="capabilities">${item.permissions.map(permission => `<span class="chip">${escapeHTML(permission)}</span>`).join('') || '<span class="muted">None</span>'}</td>
+        <td>${item.member_count}</td>
+        <td>${item.assignable ? 'Yes' : '<span class="muted">No</span>'}</td>
+        <td>${item.system ? '' : canManageRoles() ? `<button class="card-action" data-edit="${escapeHTML(item.id)}">Edit</button><button class="danger" data-delete="${escapeHTML(item.id)}">Delete</button>` : ''}</td>
+    </tr>`).join('') || '<tr><td colspan="6">No roles available for this tenant.</td></tr>';
+
+    $('#permission-list').innerHTML = state.permissions.map(item => `<tr>
+        <td><code>${escapeHTML(item.value)}</code></td>
+        <td>${escapeHTML(item.description)}</td>
+    </tr>`).join('')
+}
+
+function permissionCheckboxes(selected) {
+    const held = new Set(selected || []);
+    $('#role-permissions').innerHTML = state.permissions.map(item => `<label>
+        <input type="checkbox" name="permissions" value="${escapeHTML(item.value)}" ${held.has(item.value) ? 'checked' : ''}>
+        <span><strong>${escapeHTML(item.label)}</strong><br><small>${escapeHTML(item.description)}</small></span>
+    </label>`).join('')
+}
+
+function openDialog(item) {
+    const form = $('#role-form');
+    form.reset();
+    form.role_id.value = item?.id || '';
+    form.slug.value = item?.slug || '';
+    form.name.value = item?.name || '';
+    form.description.value = item?.description || '';
+    // The slug identifies a role for the lifetime of the role, so it is fixed
+    // once the role exists.
+    $('#role-slug-label').hidden = Boolean(item);
+    form.slug.required = !item;
+    $('#role-dialog-title').textContent = item ? `Edit ${item.name}` : 'New role';
+    $('#role-hint').textContent = item
+        ? 'Saving replaces the permissions of every member holding this role.'
+        : 'The slug cannot be changed later.';
+    permissionCheckboxes(item?.permissions);
+    $('#role-dialog').showModal()
+}
+
+$('#new-role').addEventListener('click', () => openDialog(null));
+$$('.close').forEach(button => button.addEventListener('click', () => button.closest('dialog').close()));
+
+$('#role-form').addEventListener('submit', async event => {
+    event.preventDefault();
+    const form = event.target;
+    const permissions = [...form.querySelectorAll('input[name=permissions]:checked')].map(input => input.value);
+    const id = form.role_id.value;
+    const body = id
+        ? {name: form.name.value, description: form.description.value, permissions}
+        : {tenant_id: state.selectedTenant, slug: form.slug.value, name: form.name.value, description: form.description.value, permissions};
+    try {
+        await api(id ? `/api/v1/roles/${id}` : '/api/v1/roles', {
+            method: id ? 'PUT' : 'POST',
+            body: JSON.stringify(body)
+        });
+        form.closest('dialog').close();
+        notice(id ? 'Role updated' : 'Role created');
+        await loadRoles();
+        render()
+    } catch (error) {
+        notice(error.message, true)
+    }
+});
+
+document.addEventListener('click', async event => {
+    const edit = event.target.dataset.edit;
+    if (edit) {
+        openDialog(state.roles.find(item => item.id === edit));
+        return
+    }
+    const remove = event.target.dataset.delete;
+    if (remove) {
+        const item = state.roles.find(role => role.id === remove);
+        if (!confirm(`Delete the role "${item.name}"?`)) return;
+        try {
+            await api(`/api/v1/roles/${remove}`, {method: 'DELETE'});
+            notice('Role deleted');
+            await loadRoles();
+            render()
+        } catch (error) {
+            notice(error.message, true)
+        }
+    }
+});
+
+const theme = $('#theme');
+theme.value = localStorage.getItem('gl-theme') || 'tokyo';
+document.documentElement.dataset.theme = theme.value;
+document.documentElement.dataset.mode = localStorage.getItem('gl-mode') || 'dark';
+theme.addEventListener('change', () => {
+    document.documentElement.dataset.theme = theme.value;
+    localStorage.setItem('gl-theme', theme.value)
+});
+$('#mode').addEventListener('click', () => {
+    const next = document.documentElement.dataset.mode === 'dark' ? 'light' : 'dark';
+    document.documentElement.dataset.mode = next;
+    localStorage.setItem('gl-mode', next)
+});
+$('#tenant-context').addEventListener('change', async event => {
+    state.selectedTenant = event.target.value;
+    await loadRoles();
+    render()
+});
+
+load().catch(error => notice(error.message, true));