go-loose/internal/server/useradmin.go

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package server
import (
"net/http"
"net/mail"
"net/url"
"strings"
"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/key"
"github.com/danyel/go-loose/internal/password"
)
func (s *Server) configureClient(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var request struct {
RedirectURIs []string `json:"redirect_uris"`
}
if !decodeJSON(w, r, &request) {
return
}
if len(request.RedirectURIs) == 0 {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "at least one redirect URI is required")
return
}
seen := make(map[string]bool)
for index, raw := range request.RedirectURIs {
parsed, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(raw))
if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" || parsed.Host == "" || parsed.Fragment != "" || parsed.User != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "redirect URIs must be absolute URLs without fragments or credentials")
return
}
localHTTP := (s.cfg.DevLogin || s.cfg.LocalLogin) && parsed.Scheme == "http" &&
(parsed.Hostname() == "localhost" || parsed.Hostname() == "127.0.0.1")
if parsed.Scheme != "https" && !localHTTP {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "redirect URIs require HTTPS except localhost in development")
return
}
request.RedirectURIs[index] = parsed.String()
if seen[parsed.String()] {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "redirect URIs must be unique")
return
}
seen[parsed.String()] = true
}
secret, _, hash, err := key.GenerateToken("glc_secret_")
if err != nil {
s.internalError(w, "generate client secret", err)
return
}
app, err := s.store.ConfigureClient(r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID, r.PathValue("id"), request.RedirectURIs, hash)
if err != nil {
s.handleStoreError(w, "configure client login", err)
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"application": app, "client_secret": secret})
}
func (s *Server) inviteUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var request struct {
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
Email string `json:"email"`
DisplayName string `json:"display_name"`
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RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
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Password string `json:"password"`
}
if !decodeJSON(w, r, &request) {
return
}
address, err := mail.ParseAddress(strings.TrimSpace(request.Email))
if err != nil || address.Address != request.Email {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "a valid plain email address is required")
return
}
request.Email = strings.ToLower(address.Address)
request.DisplayName = strings.TrimSpace(request.DisplayName)
if request.DisplayName == "" {
request.DisplayName = request.Email
}
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if strings.TrimSpace(request.RoleID) == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role_id is required")
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return
}
passwordHash, err := password.Hash(request.Password)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
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user, err := s.store.InviteUser(r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID, request.TenantID, request.Email, request.DisplayName, request.RoleID, passwordHash)
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if err != nil {
s.handleStoreError(w, "invite user", err)
return
}
feat: account menu, database roles, and single logout Bundles the console work from the current branch: the header account control, database-backed roles and permissions, and signing out across the applications that share this sign-in. The account control replaces a separate identity chip and a separate sign-out button, which meant the header carried two controls describing one fact. web/account.js is mounted into every page by a placeholder and owns the keyboard handling, the outside-click behaviour and the sign-out form once. It also fills the trigger's name, which the previous markup left empty. Signing out revokes the hosted-login bearer sessions this installation issued, then redirects to the provider's end_session_endpoint when the discovery document advertises one. Applications that authenticate against this installation therefore lose their session too; one pointed straight at an identity provider is out of its reach and is unchanged. Roles and permissions become rows rather than a closed enum, so a tenant can extend the catalog without a migration, and a role can no longer be granted a capability that is not in it. requireSameOrigin now compares against the origin the request arrived on instead of the configured base URL, which defaulted to http://localhost:8080 and so rejected every write in a deployment that never set it. Two bugs found while verifying in a browser: - A profile picture never rendered. avatarURL built an absolute URL from the configured base URL, and the page's own img-src 'self' blocked it. The console's own pages now take a root-relative path; only /connect/userinfo, read from another origin, needs an absolute one, and it follows the request. - absoluteURL preferred the configuration over the request while its comment claimed the opposite, which also misdirected the logout redirect. Card layout: the footer was one two-column row shared between a label and a forty-character identifier, so the identifier took the width and crushed its label into three stacked words. Each pair is a line now, the value truncates with the full text in the title, and cards align their footers across a row.
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user.AvatarURL = s.avatarPath(user.AvatarKey)
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, user)
}
func (s *Server) setUserAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var request struct {
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
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RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
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ApplicationIDs []string `json:"application_ids"`
}
if !decodeJSON(w, r, &request) {
return
}
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if strings.TrimSpace(request.RoleID) == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role_id is required")
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return
}
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if err := s.store.SetUserAccess(r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID, request.TenantID, r.PathValue("id"), request.RoleID, request.ApplicationIDs); err != nil {
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s.handleStoreError(w, "update user access", err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
func (s *Server) approveUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var request struct {
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
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RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
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ApplicationIDs []string `json:"application_ids"`
}
if !decodeJSON(w, r, &request) {
return
}
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if strings.TrimSpace(request.RoleID) == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role_id is required")
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return
}
if err := s.store.ApprovePendingUser(
r.Context(), claimsFrom(r).UserID, request.TenantID, r.PathValue("id"),
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request.RoleID, request.ApplicationIDs,
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); err != nil {
s.handleStoreError(w, "approve pending user", err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}